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THE GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, SKILL, AND 
EXPERIENCE PARADOX 
CAMILLA A. HRDY* 
Abstract: Can employers use trade secret law to prevent employees from using 
knowledge and skills they acquired on the job? Courts in all fifty states say no—
an employee’s general knowledge, skill, and experience cannot be protected as a 
trade secret. Yet a benchmark principle of trade secret law is that employers can 
share trade secrets with employees so long as they take reasonable measures to 
preserve the information’s secrecy. The result is a paradox that runs to the heart 
of trade secret law: employers are encouraged to communicate trade secrets to 
employees, but this information loses protection if it becomes part of those em-
ployees’ unprotectable general knowledge, skill, and experience. This Article 
traces the roots of this doctrine in the common law and shows how it has been 
incorporated, though never actually codified, in statutes, including the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016. As originally construed, the general knowledge, skill 
and experience exclusion was intended to preserve an employee’s right to im-
prove her skills on the job and thereafter transfer those skills to a different job or 
business endeavor. Trade secret law was thus interpreted not to encompass in-
formation that an employee needed in order to continue working in her profes-
sion. This Article reveals that, despite longstanding recognition of the doctrine, 
courts today misapply and misunderstand it. Rather than separately assessing 
whether claimed trade secrets constitute an employee’s unprotectable general 
knowledge, skill, and experience, many courts simply assess whether the infor-
mation is generally known to others outside the company or was previously 
known to the employee before she took the job—and stop there. Courts therefore 
miss the category of information that, while technically secret to a company, is 
nonetheless unprotectable. Such oversights stymie the development of trade se-
cret law and have potentially devastating effects for employee-defendants, who 
may be prevented from taking a new job even when they have not signed a non-
competition agreement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The story has entered trade secret canon. In 2007, when Google’s self-
driving car project (now known as Waymo) was getting underway, the compa-
ny hired a roboticist and engineer named Anthony Levandowski.1 Levan-
dowski’s job was to help Google develop Light Detection and Ranging (Li-
DAR) for Waymo cars.2 LiDAR are the laser scanners placed on the tops of the 
cars.3 They are essential because they enable autonomous vehicles to “see” 
objects in the road.4 In 2016, after nearly ten years on Google’s payroll learn-
ing from Google’s experts, Levandowski left Google, launched a new start-up, 
and sold it for $680 million to Uber Technologies, Waymo’s major competitor 
in the self-driving car space.5 Uber then hired Levandowski as the head of Ub-
er’s self-driving car team.6 A number of other Waymo driverless car team em-
ployees resigned to join Uber as well.7 Levandowski’s goal, in his own words, 
was to “replicate” Waymo’s technology on behalf of Uber—that is why he se-
cretly downloaded 14,000 pages of Waymo files when he left.8 Due to a misdi-
rected e-mail, however, Waymo learned what was happening, and immediately 
sued Uber in federal district court in the Northern District of California for 
misappropriation of trade secrets, seeking an injunction forcing Uber to stop 
using Waymo secrets and return all Waymo property.9 
It was, it seemed, the most egregious case of trade secret theft in Silicon 
Valley. As Judge William Alsup put it in an early hearing: “You don’t get many 
cases where there is pretty direct proof that somebody downloaded 14,000 
documents, and then left the next day.”10 Judge Alsup granted, in short order, 
Waymo’s request that Uber “immediately . . . remove [Levandoski] from any 
role or responsibility pertaining to LiDAR” and “take all steps in their power 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See First Amended Complaint ¶ 4, Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00939 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Am. Compl.] (describing Levandowski as a leader of Waymo’s efforts 
to create a self-driving car); Mark Harris, God Is a Bot and Anthony Levandowski Is His Messenger, 
WIRED (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/god-is-a-bot-and-anthony-levandowski-is-his-
messenger/ [https://perma.cc/W6D5-SMP3] (discussing Levandowski’s 2007 hire as part of a team of 
engineers). 
 2 Harris, supra note 1. 
 3 Am. Compl., supra note 1, ¶ 2. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 55. 
 6 Id. ¶ 56. 
 7 Id. ¶¶ 6, 50–54. 
 8 Id. ¶ 42. These allegations are laid out in detail in Waymo’s complaint. See id. ¶¶ 42–49. 
 9 Id. ¶¶ 3 (discussing the inadvertent email), 66–148 (bringing causes of action under state and 
federal trade secret law as well as patent infringement and unfair competition). 
 10 Transcript of Proceedings at 20:5–7, Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00393 
(N.D. Cal. Mar 17, 2017). 
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to prevent him from having any communication on the subject of LiDAR” 
with others at Uber.11 
Yet, as trial approached, Waymo’s case began to break down. For one 
thing, Waymo was having trouble proving that the 14,000 files or any other 
Google files ever made it to Uber.12 Since Levandowski had invoked the Fifth 
Amendment and refused to explain what happened, this was a big problem for 
Waymo’s case.13 For another thing, it was becoming increasingly unclear 
whether any of the information Levandowski took actually constituted a trade 
secret. Uber contended that the information was well-known in the field of 
optics and had been disclosed to the public in patents and publicly available 
literature.14 Even assuming some information in the files was unknown outside 
Waymo’s walls, and economically valuable to others in the industry, Uber ar-
gued this was part of Levandowski’s “[g]eneralized knowledge and skill,” 
which he had “learned on the job,” and which Waymo could not legally protect 
as trade secrets.15 Indeed, in Uber’s telling, Levandowski’s tale was quite dif-
ferent from that sketched out above. Since 2004, Levandowski worked in the 
self-driving car industry.16 He was a named inventor on several of Waymo’s 
self-driving car patents—one of which Waymo was asserting against Uber in 
this very case.17 He was the founder of several companies.18 Maybe Levan-
dowski was the guy who taught Google everything it knew about LiDAR. 
Maybe the law should not stop him from leaving to continue developing solu-
                                                                                                                           
 11 Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2017 WL 2123560, at *13 (N.D. 
Cal. May 15, 2017). 
 12 See generally Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Waymo LLC 
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00393 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2017). 
 13 See Darrell Etherington & Kate Conger, Uber’s Anthony Levandowski Invokes Fifth Amend-
ment Rights in Waymo Suit, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 7, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/30/ubers-
anthony-levandowski-invokes-fifth-amendment-rights-in-waymo-suit/ [https://perma.cc/APU9-JQSQ] 
(discussing Levandowski’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment and defense counsel’s assertion that 
Uber did not have the stolen documents). 
 14 Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 12, at 1–3. 
 15 See Defendants’ Memoranda of Law in Support of Disputed Jury Instructions at 24, Waymo 
LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00939 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2017) (“Generalized knowledge 
and skill that an employee learned on the job is not a trade secret.”); see also id. at 2 (“Some aspects 
of those systems are undeniably not trade secrets—instead, they may be ‘general engineering princi-
ples in the public domain and part of the intellectual equipment of technical employees.’” (quoting 
Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 139 (9th Cir. 1965))). 
 16 Harris, supra note 1. 
 17 Devices and Methods for a Rotating LiDAR Platform with a Shared Transmit/Receive Path, 
U.S. Patent No. 8,836,922; see also Am. Compl., supra note 1, ¶¶ 89–101 (alleging infringement of 
the ‘922 Patent). 
 18 Harris, supra note 1. Levandowski has founded yet another self-driving car company. See An-
thony Levandowski, Pronto Means Ready, MEDIUM: PRONTO AI (Dec. 18, 2018), https://medium.
com/pronto-ai/pronto-means-ready-e885bc8ec9e9 [perma.cc/WPB5-ADLW]. He now asserts, howev-
er, that LiDAR is not the wave of the future and that progress to fully autonomous vehicles will be far 
slower than some had envisioned. Id. 
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tions for making self-driving cars work. In the end, Uber’s lawyers were suc-
cessful in urging the court to include a jury instruction explaining the rule that 
trade secrets “do not cover skills, talents, or abilities developed by employees 
in their employment even though they may be developed at the expense of the 
employer.”19 
We will never know what the jury would have decided, since the parties 
settled four days into the trial.20 But Uber’s defense highlights a foundational, 
yet largely misunderstood doctrine in trade secret law. It holds that trade secret 
law cannot be used to prevent employees who have not signed a non-
competition agreement from using general skills, knowledge, training, and ex-
perience they acquired during the course of their employment for the benefit of 
a competing employer.21 Although the doctrine lacks a clear statutory hook in 
the language of either the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),22 or the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act (DTSA),23 courts,24 restatements of law,25 major treatises,26 
and academics all recognize its existence.27 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Penultimate Jury Instructions on Trade Secret Misappropriation at 4, Waymo LLC v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00393 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2018). 
 20 Alexandria Sage et al., Waymo Accepts $245 Million and Uber’s ‘Regret’ to Settle Self-Driving 
Car Dispute, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-uber-trial/waymo-
accepts-245-million-and-ubers-regret-to-settle-self-driving-car-dispute-idUSKBN1FT2BA [perma.
cc/ZX2P-YLFJ]. Levandowski is now facing criminal charges of trade secret theft and attempted trade 
secret theft. See Camilla A. Hrdy, Anthony Levandowski: Is Being a Jerk a Crime?, WRITTEN DE-
SCRIPTION (Sept. 8, 2019), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2019/09/anthony-levandowski-is-
being-jerk-crime.html [https://perma.cc/47WD-EN4Q]. 
 21 See Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 776 (Pa. 1965); infra 
notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
 22 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1–12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985). Nearly all states adopted 
some version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). After the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) 
passed on May 11, 2016, plaintiffs obtained the opportunity to bring both state and federal claims. See 
DTSA, 18 U.S.C. § 1838 (2018) (excluding preemption of federal or state remedies). 
 23 See id. §§ 1836–1839 (codifying the DTSA). 
 24 See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1262 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 25 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 
1995). 
 26 See, e.g., 3 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 14:35 (4th 
ed. 2019). 
 27 See ELIZABETH A. ROWE & SHARON K. SANDEEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE SECRET 
LAW 108 (1st ed. 2012) [hereinafter ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW] (“The general rule is that a former 
employee may use the general knowledge, skills, and experience acquired during his or her employ-
ment, even in competition with his or her former employer.”); see also Joseph P. Fishman & Deepa 
Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PENN. L. REV. 1051, 1086–87 (2019) (“Trade secret subject 
matter . . . excludes information that is described in prior publications, generally known within an 
industry, readily ascertainable from commercialized products, or attributable to an employee’s prior 
skill and expertise.”) (emphasis added); Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A 
Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387, 392 (2007) [hereinafter Graves, The Law of Negative 
Knowledge] (“Where information is on the margin between secrecy and non-secrecy, the former em-
ployee’s guiding principle, long established in trade secret law, is that he can use information that falls 
within his general skills, knowledge, training, and experience.”); Douglas S. Liebhafsky, Industrial 
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The rule appears to generate a simple dichotomy. It distinguishes between 
an employee’s general knowledge, skill, and experience, which cannot be pro-
tected using trade secret law, and her employer’s trade secrets, which can be 
protected using trade secret law. As one academic put it, general skills, 
knowledge, training, and experience serve as “a sort of loose shorthand for the 
corpus of information every employee may take from job to job,” notwith-
standing the strictures of trade secret law.28 
Yet upon closer reflection, it becomes clear that this limitation on trade 
secret protection contains a paradox. On the one hand, trade secret law permits 
employers to disclose trade secrets to employees in order to allow them to be 
productive in their tasks.29 Thus, courts often cavalierly state the rule that “dis-
closure [of trade secrets] to employees involved in the use of the subject matter 
does not ordinarily destroy the protection afforded the employer.”30 On the 
other hand, information that would otherwise constitute a trade secret loses 
protection once it becomes integrated with the employee’s general skill, 
knowledge, training, and experience.31 So can employers really share with em-
                                                                                                                           
Secrets and the Skilled Employee, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 324, 325 (1963) (“The subject matter of a 
claimed trade secret cannot be: (1) a matter of common knowledge or of general knowledge in a trade 
. . . or (2) a part of the ‘personal skills, knowledge and experience’ of another, typically an employee 
. . . .”); Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Spill Your (Trade) Secrets: Knowledge Networks as Innovation 
Drivers, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1595 (2017) (“A fundamental set of countervailing public 
policies guides state law in establishing the dividing line between general skill and knowledge and 
trade secrets: the protection of business interests from unfair competition, on the one hand, and the 
public interest in labor mobility leading to ‘competition and the dissemination of ideas, which in turn 
benefit the consumer’ on the other.”); Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: 
Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 184 (2005) 
(“It has long been established that a former employee may take general knowledge with him to a new 
employer.”); Sharon K. Sandeen & Elizabeth A. Rowe, Debating Employee Non-Competes and Trade 
Secrets, 33 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 438, 465 (2017) [hereinafter Sandeen, De-
bating Non-Competes] (“Consistent with common law limitations on the scope of protectable infor-
mation, the information to be protected cannot include the general skill and knowledge that is part of 
the employee’s toolkit.”); Deepa Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. 1543, 1561 n.95 (2018) [hereinafter Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface] (“While 
an employee cannot divulge protected trade secrets, she is free to take her ‘general skills and 
knowledge,’ as well as her industry-specific knowledge from one employer to another.”); Laura 
Wheeler, Trade Secrets and the Skilled Employee in the Computer Industry, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 823, 
834 (1983) (“The employee does not incur liability . . . when the former employer merely alleges that 
the employee’s general skill and knowledge ‘belonged’ to the employer as a trade secret.”) Jack F. 
Kuhlman, Comment, Trade Regulation—Trade Secrets—Ex-Employee’s Use of Former Employer’s 
Trade Secret May Be Enjoined, 42 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 89 (1965) (“[T]he employee is entitled to 
take with him and use the general knowledge, experience, and skill which he has acquired during the 
employment relationship, even if such knowledge is used in competition with the former employer.”). 
 28 Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 39, 52 (2007). 
 29 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974) (finding secrecy is not lost 
when a trade secret is disclosed to employees for its intended use); see also infra notes 154–163. 
 30 See, e.g., Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 185 F. Supp. 594, 599 (D.N.J. 1960). 
 31 See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
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ployees? How much? If they share more, if they train more, aren’t they risking 
their secrets being sucked away by the employee, whom the law says is free to 
use and take the general skill-set he or she has acquired to a new job? 
Despite scattered attempts to clarify the scope of the doctrine,32 courts 
struggle to apply and even to articulate it.33 Some courts,34 as well as some 
academics, simply ignore it.35 Others assert, somewhat nihilistically, that find-
ing information constitutes general knowledge, skill, and experience simply 
denotes the fact-finder’s overall conclusion that the information is not a trade 
secret.36 On this account, there is no separate doctrine at all. This view admit-
tedly gains support from courts’ ambiguous statements, such as this typical 
example from an appellate court: “[A] former employee may use general 
knowledge, skill, and experience acquired in his or her former employment in 
competition with a former employer, . . . [but] may not use confidential infor-
mation or trade secrets in doing so.”37 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Several of these attempts result in lengthy lists of “factors to consider” without developing an 
overarching explanation of the Exclusion’s purpose and doctrinal scope. See, e.g., Letty J. Friesen, 
Update, Distinguishing Between an Employee’s General Knowledge & Trade Secrets, 23 COLO. LAW. 
2123, 2123 (1994) (outlining seven factors that courts consider “important in distinguishing between 
general knowledge of the employee and the trade secrets of the former employer”); Miles J. Feldman, 
Comment, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable Information: Trade Secrets & the Employment 
Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 175–77 (1994) (providing five factors that courts should weigh 
to “determine whether information is a protectable trade secret or part of the employee’s general 
knowledge and skill”). 
 33 See, e.g., CALLMANN, supra note 26 (“[T]his over-simplified principle is much easier to state 
than to apply.”); Varadarajan, The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, supra note 27, at 1561 n.95 
(“However, the line between these categories and an employer’s protected trade secrets is blurry.”); 
Feldman, supra note 32, at 171 (observing a of lack of clarity in the law). 
 34 See infra notes 233–279 and accompanying text. 
 35 A leading IP case book does not have a section regarding the exclusion of general knowledge, 
skill, and experience—though it does have a section devoted to other issues involving departing em-
ployees. PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY, & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2018, at 106–31 (2018); see also Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted M. 
Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets 16 (U.S.C.L. Sch., Working Paper No. 
207, 2016), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/df2e/ca68c18dfcde41c754697de86e00f1f822c7.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WJA4-VN5X] (“[S]ome states with purportedly weak, legislatively driven enforcement of 
noncompetes may have compensated via stronger judicial enforcement of legal substitutes for non-
competes, such as trade secret law.”). 
 36 See, e.g., Robert Unikel, Bridging the “Trade Secret” Gap: Protecting “Confidential Infor-
mation” Not Rising to The Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 842–43 (1998) (critiqu-
ing “the current two-tiered protective scheme,” in which information is “either protectable ‘trade se-
crets’ or unprotectable ‘general skill and knowledge’”); see also Andrea Weiss Jeffries, A Key Dis-
tinction: Knowledge, Skills, and Training vs. Trade Secrets, in TRADE SECRETS 2018: WHAT EVERY 
LAWYER SHOULD KNOW 351, 355 (2018) (concluding that “the vast majority state the principle as 
part of a broad set of trade secret principles, and then focus their discussion on other aspects of trade 
secret law”). 
 37 Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). The court held that the 
roofing company possessed trade secrets in a customer list and enjoined former employees from solic-
iting the customers. Id. at 731. 
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Indeterminacy about the scope of this doctrine generates uncertainty 
around what information employers can protect and how much information 
employers can safely disclose to employees.38 If employers do not understand 
what constitutes unprotectable knowledge, skill, and experience, they may be 
forced to take costly measures to shield trade secrets from their own employ-
ees, or decline to share at all.39 This would seem to risk undermining one of the 
major justifications for trade secret law: increasing the productive sharing of 
information between employers and employees.40 
This Article demonstrates that there is a separate limitation on trade secret 
protection that prohibits employers from protecting an employee’s general 
knowledge, skill, and experience. This limitation—hereafter referred to as the 
General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion, or simply the Exclu-
sion—serves an essential and unique function in trade secret law that is distinct 
from other doctrines, and more than just a negative statement that a trade se-
cret does not exist. The Exclusion evolved in common law due to courts’ 
recognition that, in fact, trade secret law created a “paradox” for employees. As 
one court put it, “paradoxically,” the employee who receives and is improved 
by his employer’s valuable trade secrets is thereafter “restrained, because of 
his increased expertise, from advancing further in the industry in which he is 
most productive.”41 Trade secret law still places this imposition on employees 
today.42 The big question for an engineer like Levandowski is, “how does 
someone take his or her accumulated experience to a competitor without get-
ting sued?”43 The purpose of the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience 
Exclusion is to address precisely this dilemma. Forged in equity, the Exclusion 
is based on a public policy of preserving employees’ ability to improve on the 
job and transfer their skills to other work.44 It is an “extraneous legal princi-
ple”45 that applies even to information the employer imparted to the employee 
in confidence that would otherwise qualify as a trade secret, but that has be-
                                                                                                                           
 38 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 32, at 171 (“The uncertain status of what constitutes unprotecta-
ble employee knowledge and skill is inefficient because it results in both over-deterrence and under-
deterrence.”). 
 39 See Victoria A. Cundiff, Maximum Security: How to Prevent Departing Employees from Put-
ting Your Trade Secrets to Work for Your Competitors, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
301, 302–03, 304–06 (1992) [hereinafter Cundiff, Maximum Security] (describing potential conse-
quences of failing to protect trade secrets and defining trade secrets). 
 40 See infra notes 164–184 and accompanying text. 
 41 Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (Pa. 1960); see infra notes 86–121, 185–206 and 
accompanying text. 
 42 See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE (2013) (characterizing trade secret 
law as one of several legal mechanisms companies use to restrain movement of talent). 
 43 James Pooley, How to Change Jobs and Embrace Inefficiency, IP WATCHDOG (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/05/23/how-to-change-jobs-embrace-inefficiency/id=97568/ [https://
perma.cc/DNK9-A4VD]. 
 44 See infra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
 45 See AMÉDÉE TURNER, THE LAW OF TRADE SECRETS 115–72 (1962). 
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come inextricably “merged” with the employee’s unprotectable general 
knowledge, skill, and experience.46 
The consequence for trade secret plaintiffs like Waymo is that they must 
expect some leakage of trade secrets to result when they share trade secrets 
with employees.47 In an article written for employers, Victoria Cundiff, a part-
ner at a large global law firm, stated, “[t]he fact that at the end of the job an 
employee is a better engineer, has learned more computer languages, has made 
more sales presentations or has met more customers does not mean he or she 
cannot put this improved self to work for a competitor.”48 While employers 
might argue that employees’ receipt of sensitive secrets provides a reason to 
prevent employees from leaving, the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experi-
ence Exclusion serves as a crucial limitation on their ability to use trade secret 
law to stop such departures. The over-all effect of the Exclusion is to limit the 
scope of trade secrets in order to shield affected employees’ ability to find suit-
able work.49 
The Article shows, unfortunately, that courts currently misunderstand and 
regularly misapply the doctrine. In practice, most courts appear to conflate the 
Exclusion with the requirement that a trade secret not be “generally known” or 
“readily ascertainable” to others in the industry.50 On this view, the Exclusion 
is simply a part of the law’s “secrecy” requirement, rather than a distinct limi-
tation.51 Another approach, similar in effect, is to assume the Exclusion applies 
only to information the employee already had in her possession prior to com-
ing to work for the plaintiff-employer.52 These erroneous approaches to the 
Exclusion obscure its true function and have potentially devastating effects for 
employees, who may be wrongly prevented from using knowledge, skills, or 
experience that they acquired on the job when they leave, even when they have 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See infra notes 279–329 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 185–206 and accompanying text. 
 48 Victoria Cundiff, How to Hire Your Competitor’s Employee: A Trade Secrets Perspective, 3 
N.Y. BUS. L.J., Fall 1999, at 13; see also, e.g., Great Am. Opportunities, Inc. v. Cherry Bros., LLC, 
No. 3:17-cv-1022, 2018 WL 418567, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 16, 2018) (“[I]nsofar as any of the Indi-
vidual Defendants were simply better salespeople on the day they left Great American than they had 
been on the day they started, their acquisition of general sales skills, valuable though it may have 
been, is not an asset covered by trade secret law.”). 
 49 As discussed in Part I, contract law is a separate legal mechanism that may be used; the extent 
to which employers can use contracts to protect more than trade secret law varies among jurisdictions. 
See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
 50 See UTSA § 1(4)(i) (defining trade secret the same as the DTSA). Compare 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(3)(B) (defining trade secrets as excluding “generally known” and “readily ascertainable infor-
mation”), with Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 465, 482 
(M.D.N.C. 2002) (upholding a jury instruction that did not specifically exclude general knowledge, 
skill, and experience, because it defined a trade secret as “not being generally known or readily ascer-
tainable”). 
 51 See infra notes 233–278 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 279–329 and accompanying text. 
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not signed a non-competition agreement.53 If courts were to recognize this in-
consistency, and return to the original conception of the Exclusion, this would 
likely expand the rights of defendants in cases where information is secret 
within a company but has nonetheless become unprotectable against the com-
pany’s former employees or their would-be employers for reasons of public 
policy. 
Part I provides a background to the General Knowledge, Skill, and Expe-
rience Exclusion as originally conceived at common law.54 It then details the 
odd manner in which the doctrine has been incorporated, but never actually 
codified, in modern trade secret statutes, most recently in the federal Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2016.55 
Part II identifies the major policy justifications for the Exclusion and how 
it fits into the rest of trade secret law.56 There are, in short, two distinct but re-
lated policy justifications: protecting individuals’ rights to pursue satisfying 
work and to improve within their area of expertise; and promoting the public’s 
interest in free employee mobility.57 
Part III reviews and closely engages with the General Knowledge, Skill, 
and Experience Exclusion case law.58 More than any other area of intellectual 
property law, trade secret cases turn on the facts.59 Therefore, truly understand-
ing how the Exclusion works, both normatively and in practice, requires a deep 
dive into specific cases in which courts apply it. Using the case law, but guided 
by policy, this Part extracts the core principles of the Exclusion, and explains 
how the Exclusion should, ideally, be conceptualized and applied.60 It also re-
veals where courts currently err—particularly, by conflating the Exclusion with 
the UTSA’s (and the now the DTSA’s) requirement that a trade secret not be 
“generally known” or “readily ascertainable” to others in the industry. Part III 
explains why these approaches are wrong and potentially harmful to the em-
ployees involved in the cases. 
                                                                                                                           
 53 The effect is somewhat similar to the controversial so-called “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. 
See infra notes 187–201 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 63–150 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 141–150 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 151–206 and accompanying text. 
 57 As discussed infra, notes 202–206 and accompanying text, there is significant debate over the 
economic impacts of employee mobility. 
 58 See infra notes 207–373 and accompanying text. 
 59 As Victoria Cundiff puts it, “[t]rade secrets disputes are highly fact-intensive. Those consider-
ing litigating trade secrets issues must focus on the facts of leading cases just as much as on the lan-
guage of the holdings.” Victoria A. Cundiff, Thinking About What You Want Can Help You Get What 
You Need: How Advocates Can Work with Courts to Tailor Case-Specific Procedures and Remedies 
to Trade Secret Disputes, in TRADE SECRETS 2014: WHAT EVERY IP ATTORNEY SHOULD KNOW 45, 
59 (PRACTICING L. INST. ed., 2014). 
 60 See infra notes 330–374 and accompanying text. 
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The Article concludes by urging courts to more accurately identify, state, 
and apply the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion. Even if 
courts do not use the Exclusion to deny trade secret protection,61 they should 
take it into account at the remedial stage when considering affected employees’ 
interests in pursuing satisfying work, as compared to employers’ interest in 
protecting trade secrets. Courts cannot simply ignore this analysis.62 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, SKILL  
AND EXPERIENCE EXCLUSION 
Trade secret law does not protect information that is generally known to 
people in the industry; that does not derive sufficient economic value from be-
ing a secret; or that is not subject to the trade secret holder’s “reasonable” ef-
forts to preserve its secrecy. These limitations are expressly codified in the text 
of the relevant statutes.63 In contrast, as this Part will show, the General 
Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion is not directly mentioned in the 
statutory text; but it nonetheless exists and has a long pedigree.64  
Section A explains the general rule, stated by courts across the country, 
that trade secret law does not protect information that has become part of an 
employee’s “general knowledge, skill, and experience.”65 Section B traces the 
common law origins of this doctrine.66 Section C explains its somewhat awk-
ward fit within statutory trade secret law.67 
A. Basic Doctrine 
The principle behind the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Ex-
clusion is that trade secret law does not protect the “general knowledge, skill, 
and experience” that an employee acquires during the course of employment.68 
                                                                                                                           
 61 As discussed infra, notes 207–232 and accompanying text, the Exclusion is already a uniquely 
“relative” form of subject matter exclusion, operating only against certain individuals. 
 62 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (prohibiting courts from granting an injunction where an 
individual’s employment opportunities are curtailed by general knowledge); Bimbo Bakeries USA, 
Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 119 (3d Cir. 2010) (directing the district court to create a remedy that 
protected trade secrets without curtailing the employee’s right to pursue employment); see also eBay 
Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (holding courts in patent cases must weigh 
the equitable factors before granting an injunction). 
 63 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UTSA § 1(4). 
 64 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UTSA § 1(4). 
 65 See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text. 
 66 See infra notes 86–122 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 123–150 and accompanying text. 
 68 See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1267 (Adams, J., concurring) (“[A]n employee’s gen-
eral knowledge, skill, and experience are not trade secrets. Thus in theory an employer generally may 
not inhibit the manner in which an employee uses his or her knowledge, skill, and experience—even if 
these were acquired during employment.” (citations omitted)); Van Prods. Co., 213 A.2d at 776 (hold-
ing that an employee “is entitled to take with him ‘the experience, knowledge, memory, and skill, 
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The Exclusion potentially applies even to information the employee acquired 
directly from a former employer and that might otherwise be a trade secret.69 
Courts within virtually every state and federal circuit have purported to recog-
nize this general rule.70 Contracts—usually but not always71 in the form of a 
                                                                                                                           
which he gained while . . . employed”). Generally, some iteration of the phrase “general knowledge, 
skills, and experience” is used although the terminology differs. TURNER, supra note 45, at 161. Other 
common terms include “intelligence,” “training,” and the term “personal” as a descriptor. See, e.g., 
Official Aviation Guide Co. v. Am. Aviation Assocs., Inc., 150 F.2d 173, 178 (7th Cir. 1945) (“[A]n 
employer cannot prevent his employee from using the skill and intelligence acquired through experi-
ence received in the course of the employment.” (emphasis added)); Midwest Micro Media, Inc. v. 
Machotka, 395 N.E.2d 188, 192 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (describing the employee’s knowledge as “close-
ly akin to his personal skills and abilities,” and therefore not the plaintiff’s trade secret (emphasis 
added)); Instrumentation Servs., Inc. v. Gen. Res. Corp., 283 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Minn. 1979) (finding 
that trade secret plaintiff failed to prove defendants “had material assistance other than their own 
training, skill, knowledge, and experience in developing” a product (emphasis added)).  
 69 CALLMANN, supra note 26 (“An employee, upon the termination of his employment, is free to 
draw upon his general knowledge, experience, and skill, howsoever gained, provided he does not use 
or disclose any of the specific technological or business secrets of his former employer.” (emphasis 
added)); see also 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 5.02[3][A] (2018) (describing the Exclusion); 
MELVIN F. JAGER, 1984 TRADE SECRETS LAW HANDBOOK § 5.05[5], at 133 (1984) (explaining trade 
secrets as distinct from information known to people in the industry); HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE 
SECRETS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 144–45 (1994) (describing the Exclusion).  
 70 See Capital Asset Research Corp. v. Finnegan, 160 F.3d 683, 688 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding 
employee did not misappropriate a trade secret because anyone experienced in the industry could use 
the information); Hogan Sys., Inc. v. Cybresource Int’l, Inc., 158 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 1998) (affirming 
district court’s finding that the Exclusion applied), abrogated by Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979 (2016); AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (recog-
nizing the Exclusion), superseded by statute Illinois Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
1065/1–/9 (West 1988), as recognized in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (2011); Am. Can 
Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984); Automated Sys., Inc. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 
401 F.2d 619, 625 (10th Cir. 1968) (declining to extend trade secret protection to general knowledge 
acquired by the employee); Midland-Ross Corp., 293 F.2d at 412 (“Necessarily the former employee 
may use what he learned in the former employer’s business while engaged in business for himself or 
some business competing with the former employer.”); Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical Innovations 
Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1312–14 (D. Utah 1999) (holding employer failed to distinguish 
alleged trade secret from employees general knowledge, skill, and experience), aff’d, 251 F.3d 171 
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 1462 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (recognizing 
the Exclusion); Pressure Sci., Inc. v. Kramer, 413 F. Supp. 618, 629 (D. Conn. 1976) (holding that an 
employee cannot be barred from using his general skill and experience in the industry), aff’d, 551 F.2d 
301 (2d Cir. 1976); George O’Day Assocs., Inc. v. Talman Corp., 206 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D.R.I. 1962) 
(“[A]n employee after leaving the service of an employer may carry on the same business on his own 
and use for his own benefits the things he has learned while in the earlier employment.” (quoting 
Midland-Ross Corp., 293 F.2d at 412)), aff’d, 310 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1962); Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. 
Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 266 (S.D. Cal.1958) (“[E]quity has no power to compel a man 
who changes employers to wipe clean the slate of his memory.”), aff’d, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960); 
Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., 173 F. Supp. 516, 524 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (recognizing the Exclusion), 
aff’d, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960); Thiberg v. Bach, 107 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D.N.J. 1952) (providing 
defendant “may use . . . the mechanical skill which he has acquired by virtue of his employment”). 
 71 See Orly Lobel, Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contract in Intellectual Property Law, 96 
B.U. L. REV. 869, 874 (2016) (revealing a much broader range of contracts used as post-employment 
restrictions, “such as non-solicitation, non-dealing, and non-disclosure clauses”). 
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non-competition agreement72—can be used in most states73 and in most pro-
fessions74 to place restrictions on employees’ ability to use their “general 
knowledge, skill, and experience” following employment, at least so long as 
those restrictions are reasonable in scope and duration, and necessary to pro-
tect the employer’s legitimate business interests.75 Contracts can also be used 
to protect merely confidential information, depending on which state one is 
in.76 But trade secret law itself cannot be used to protect employee’s “general 
                                                                                                                           
 72 A non-competition agreement is a contract entered between an employer and an employee that 
provides that the employee cannot compete with the employer for a certain period after her departure. 
ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW, supra note 27, at 298. They can be used to protect trade secret or non-
trade secret information. See generally Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 
ARIZ. L. REV. 939 (2013) [hereinafter Moffat, Non-Competes]; Sandeen, Debating Non-Competes, 
supra note 27, at 443–44. 
 73 Some states, such as California, do not enforce non-competition agreements by statute. Moffat, 
Non-Competes, supra note 72, at 941. California’s Business & Professions Code states: “[e]xcept as 
provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful pro-
fession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 
2019). 
 74 Certain professions, including the legal profession, do not permit non-competition agreements. 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (prohibiting lawyers from 
“offering or making . . . [an] agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination 
of the relationship”). 
 75 ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW, supra note 27, at 298; see also Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 
35, at 3 (“Historically, the common law of almost all states (subject to the long-standing California 
exception) has adopted the same balancing-test approach—known as the ‘reasonableness’ standard—
toward noncompetes.”). 
 76 See UTSA § 7(b)(1) (“This [Act] does not affect contractual remedies, whether or not based 
upon misappropriation of a trade secret.”). States differ significantly in the degree to which they en-
force contracts protecting non-trade secret information. See Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrecy and 
Common Law Confidentiality: The Problem of Multiple Regimes, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 77, 88–91 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & 
Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) [hereinafter Graves, Common Law Confidentiality] (discussing the 
difficult question of whether employment contracts can be used to prevent employees from using 
information not amounting to a trade secret); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capi-
tal Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 810 (2015) [hereinafter Lobel, 
New Cognitive Property] (“Some courts regularly accept the theory that under an employee’s duty of 
loyalty, information can be ‘confidential’ or ‘proprietary’ even if not a trade secret.”); Varadarajan, 
The Trade Secret-Contract Interface, supra note 27, at 1578–91 (noting with concern the degree to 
which contracts can be used to expand the scope of protection for information not rising to the level of 
a trade secret and proposing various doctrines, such as preemption, misuse, and contract non-
enforcement doctrines, that courts may use “to scrutinize trade-secret evasive uses of contract, particu-
larly in the employee and consumer contexts”). Compare HCC Ins. Holdings, Inc. v. Flowers, 237 
F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (finding nondisclosure agreements containing restrictions 
exceeding two years unenforceable for information that is not a trade secret), with Orthofix, Inc. v. 
Hunter, 630 F. App’x 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding employee breached employment agreement 
under Ohio law by “using and disclosing ‘confidential information’ that, while not necessarily quali-
fying as trade secrets, did not constitute his general skills or knowledge”). There are other claims 
besides contract that may be brought alongside trade secret claims—though they are often preempted 
by the UTSA. See generally Robert Denicola, The Restatements, the Uniform Act, and the Status of 
American Trade Secret Law, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY, supra, at 18, 34–44 
(discussing other claims based on misappropriation of information not rising to the level of a trade 
2422 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2409 
knowledge, skill, and experience.” The graphic below depicts this spectrum of 
protection.77 
 
The Exclusion’s purpose, explored in depth in Part II, is to preserve em-
ployees’ ability to work within a profession and to transfer their skills from one 
job to another, despite exposure to the trade secrets of a former employer.78 
One oft-cited case, Tempo Instrument, Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., a 1964 decision by 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, illustrates the Ex-
clusion’s effect on the relative rights of a plaintiff and defendant in a trade se-
cret dispute.79 In Tempo Instrument, plaintiff Tempo Instrument, Inc. (Tempo), 
the maker of patented time delay relay devices, tried to use New York unfair 
                                                                                                                           
secret); Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA Preemption and the Public Domain: How 
Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State Law Claims Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 
RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 65–66 (2012). 
 77 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals provides an example of this three-tiered categorization in 
the 2016 case Orthofix, Inc. v. Hunter, 630 F. App’x at 567 (“This case is about the relationship of 
three separate categories of business information: (1) trade secrets, (2) contractually protected confi-
dential information, and (3) general skills and knowledge.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 78 As Charles Tait Graves puts it:  
[A] standard rule courts sometimes apply to define a permissible body of knowledge 
that a mobile employee can use is his or her general skills, knowledge, training, and ex-
perience. This rule helps protect employee mobility by preventing a trade secret plain-
tiff from declaring that everything the employee learned during his or her employment 
can be classified as a trade secret. If employees could not safely transfer their training 
and skills from job to job, or change jobs without repeating the mistakes that constitut-
ed their general learning process, they would be unable to change jobs within the same 
field or start new, competing businesses. To protect employee mobility and the benefits 
that flow from it, it makes sense to go as far up to the line as possible to allow employ-
ees to apply their skills and training at a new job.” 
Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge, supra note 27, at 408–09. 
 79 229 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). Tempo Instrument is featured in Rowe and Sandeen’s case 
book in their chapter on employee’s “general knowledge, skill, and experience.” ROWE, TRADE SE-
CRET LAW, supra note 27, at 110–13. 
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competition law to enjoin its former employee, Herbert Fischer, from starting 
his own company (Logitek) making similar time relays.80 Tempo argued that 
Fischer left with trade secrets he acquired during the course of his employment 
at Tempo, including technical “know-how” related to Tempo’s patented tech-
nology used in manufacturing time delay relays and business information.81 
Ultimately, the court denied Tempo’s requested preliminary injunction, 
holding that even if Tempo possessed trade secrets related to the patented tech-
nology, Fischer’s generalized “know-how . . . constitute[d] nothing more than 
the general knowledge and experience gained by an employee in any business 
and is, therefore, not actionable.”82 In reaching this conclusion, the court ob-
served that Fischer had worked on similar technology for various employers 
prior to joining Tempo.83 These experiences “provided him with knowledge 
which made his services desirable to the plaintiff.”84 The fact that Fischer had 
improved his skills and knowledge even further while working at Tempo did 
not make his newly acquired skills, knowledge, and experience any more pro-
tectable. “[H]aving drawn upon Fischer’s prior experiences,” Tempo could 
“hardly now complain that he has added his Tempo experiences to the sum 
total of his knowledge and is utilizing this knowledge at Logitek.”85 
B. Common Law Origins of the Exclusion 
The roots of the doctrine that saved Mr. Fischer’s ability to leave his old 
employer and start a new company after learning his old employer’s secrets 
date far back in time. It is as old as trade secret law itself. 
Trade secret law’s origin story is often traced to the Industrial Revolution 
of the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Before this time, production general-
ly took place on a small artisanal scale and was “governed principally through 
social norms and restrictions on apprentice mobility through mandatory peri-
ods of service.”86 As a result of industrialization, however, large numbers of 
employees, who were often strangers to their employers and to one another, 
were crammed together on factory floors and necessarily entrusted with valua-
ble production secrets.87 New technologies, such as the spinning loom, necessi-
                                                                                                                           
 80 Tempo Instrument, 229 F. Supp. at 2. 
 81 Id. at 2, 4. Although Tempo owned a patent on the technology, known as the “Gate circuit,” it 
claimed Fischer possessed tacit knowledge undisclosed in the patent. Id. at 3. 
 82 Id. at 3–4. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 4. 
 85 Id. 
 86 MENELL, LEMLEY, & MERGES, supra note 35, at 42. 
 87 Id.; see also Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in 
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 
450–52 (2001) (discussing the shift from artisanal guilds to factory production and the subsequent 
development of the trade secret legal regime). 
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tated significant skills training, and forced employers to share technical secrets 
with workers.88  
Trade secret law evolved in large part in order to permit employers in this 
setting to engage in legally protected sharing of secrets with their own peo-
ple.89 The law did so by giving employers new rights to obtain injunctions 
from courts of law, ordering workers or others who received trade secrets in 
confidence to immediately stop using or disclosing them outside the firm.90  
However, courts did not always give trade secret holders exactly what 
they wanted. Instead, courts developed the “general knowledge, skill, and ex-
perience” doctrine as a counterforce to employers’ new rights under trade se-
cret law. 
1. English Common Law 
The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion first appeared 
in English common law with respect to enforceability of non-competition 
agreements, which courts reformed or declined to enforce on the basis that a 
worker should not be allowed to “deprive himself” through contract of the 
right to use “his labour, skill or talent.”91 Courts viewed the Exclusion as 
stemming from their power in “equity” to decline to give a remedy for reasons 
of public policy.92 Courts apparently perceived the Exclusion as arising from 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See JAMES BESSEN, LEARNING BY DOING: THE REAL CONNECTION BETWEEN INNOVATION, 
WAGES, AND WEALTH 27 (2015) (discussing weaving workers’ increased productivity as they learned 
more about how the machines worked). 
 89 See infra notes 164–184 and accompanying text. 
 90 See Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154, 154 (Ohio Super. Ct. 
1887) (discussing the “clearly established” principle that courts may use their equitable power to pre-
vent disclosure of confidential information). 
 91 See, e.g., Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, 9 L.R. Eq. 345, 354 (1869) (“Public policy requires that 
every man shall be at liberty to work for himself, and shall not be at liberty to deprive himself or the 
State of his labour, skill, or talent, by any contract that he enters into.”); see also TURNER, supra note 
45, at 120–26 (discussing various cases). Some scholars have asserted that restrictions on enforcing 
non-competition agreements stemmed from antitrust law. See ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW, supra note 
27, at 444–45 (discussing line of cases that viewed injunctive enforcement as granting a “monopoly” 
to trade secret owners). It is true that English common law sometimes treated non-competes as a “re-
straint of trade.” See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 182, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B.1711); 
see also Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 629–37 
(1960) (detailing cases at early English common law regarding non-competes); William L. Letwin, 
The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 373–79 (1954) (same). 
But the antitrust objection to non-competes has been significantly undermined. See, e.g., Outsource 
Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (“The original ra-
tionale [for hostility against non-competition agreements] had nothing to do with restraint of trade in 
its modern, antitrust sense.”). 
 92 Very generally, “equity” refers to the highly discretionary power of courts to order a remedy 
other than damages, such as an injunction. Courts’ equitable authority initially developed in the Eng-
lish Court of Chancery. Samuel Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 537 
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their “residual equitable discretion not to give an equitable remedy,”93 or to at 
least reform a remedy to make it less burdensome on affected employees,94 
“even when the plaintiff has made out all the other elements of his case.”95 
2. American Common Law 
When courts began to protect trade secrets under American common law, 
they retained their solicitude for employees’ right to work notwithstanding em-
ployers’ emerging rights under trade secret law.96 Operating under their powers 
in equity, American courts were willing to grant injunctions to protect trade 
secrets.97 
In doing so, however, courts retained their equitable discretion to deny in-
junctions that would unduly interfere with a former employee’s ability to use 
knowledge and skill that he acquired on the job.98 For instance, in the 1902 
case of National Tube Co. v. Eastern Tube Co., the Circuit Court of Ohio de-
nied an injunction to restrain the defendant-company that had hired a former 
                                                                                                                           
(2016). In the United States, most courts of equity have merged with courts of law. See id. at 538–41 
(providing background information on the merger). 
 93 See Bray, supra note 92, at 582 (discussing equitable constraints, generally) (emphasis added).  
 94 See id. at 583 (discussing ex post revision of a remedy that has become “unwise or outmoded”). 
 95 See id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 778 
n.116 (1982)); see also TURNER, supra note 45, at 11–59 (discussing English cases). 
 96 Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law & Why Courts Commit Error When 
They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 499–500 (2010) [here-
inafter Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law]. Sandeen briefly mentions courts’ continuing 
solicitude for “general skill, and knowledge.” See id. at 499 (noting a decision where the court “was 
careful to distinguish between secret information on one hand and public information, general skill, 
and knowledge on the other” (citing Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401 (W.D. Mich. 
1908))). On the development of American trade secret law in this period, generally, see id. at 498–
502; see also Michael Risch, An Empirical Look at Trade Secret Law’s Shift from Common to Statuto-
ry Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 151, 153–55 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh 
ed., 2013) (providing an abbreviated history of the development of U.S. trade secret law). 
 97 HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 143, 149, at 297–
98, 303–04 (2d ed. 1917) (“Courts of equity will restrain a party from making a disclosure of . . . se-
crets of trade or secrets of title or any other secrets of the party important to his interests.”). Courts 
sometimes operated under the theory that developing and retaining the secrecy of economically valua-
ble subject matter created a qualified property right. See, e.g., Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 
(1868). But see E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (ques-
tioning whether trade secrets should be protected as property or based merely on a breach of a duty of 
confidence). 
 98 See, e.g., Hamilton Mfg. Co., 216 F. at 407 (“It would be a violation of every right of an em-
ploye [sic] of a manufacturer to prevent the former from using, in a business of his own, knowledge 
which he acquired in the employ of the latter when he might have acquired such knowledge in the 
employ of other manufacturers.” (quoting Cincinnati Bell, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint at 155)); see also, 
e.g., Cal. Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 188 P.2d 303, 306 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) (“Some 
knowledge gained by an employee is of such a general character that equity will not restrict its later 
use.”); cf. Peabody, 98 Mass. at 455 (rejecting employee’s argument that an injunction would leave 
him “unfitted for other business,” because he could only do it at the former employer’s pleasure, 
thereby denying his “general skill as a machinist”). 
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employee of the plaintiff-company, Harry Nuttall. Plaintiff was a company that 
operated a tube works. While employed there, Nuttall secretly took with him 
patterns of the plaintiff’s machines and had castings of new machines made 
from them for the defendant, a competing company.99 The court denied the 
injunction on the basis that the patterns “were the result of the combined 
knowledge of men in the employ of the master.”100 Although the plaintiff may 
have paid for some of the “skill, knowledge, and experience” of employees’ 
like Nuttall, it “did not buy the brain” of these men.101 The Ohio Supreme 
Court unanimously affirmed the decision on appeal.102 
3. The Restatement (First) of Torts (1939) 
Trade secret protection remained a creature of common law until the 
1980s, but there were some steps towards codification along the way. As Pro-
fessor Sharon Sandeen recounts, around the same time that the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Erie v. Tompkins put an end to federal courts’ role in craft-
ing most common law, the American Law Institute set about collecting and 
“restating” state common law decisions on trade secrets to promote uniformity 
and certainty in the law.103 The result was the Restatement (First) of Torts 
(1939) (First Restatement).104 
Surprisingly, since its goal was to restate the common law, the First Re-
statement does not provide an explicit statement of the General Knowledge, 
Skill, and Experience Exclusion. The First Restatement provides six factors to 
be considered in determining whether information is a trade secret.105 Among 
                                                                                                                           
 99 Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 13 Ohio C.D. 468, 468 (1902). 
 100 Id. at 473–74. 
 101 Id. at 473. 
 102 Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 70 N.E. 1127 (Ohio 1903) (mem) (per curiam). 
 103 Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law, supra note 96, at 500–01, 503–04. In a later 
article, Sandeen discusses the American Law Institute’s efforts to capture all post-Erie developments 
in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Erie/Sears/Compco 
Squeeze: Erie’s Effects on Unfair Competition and Trade Secret Law, 52 AKRON L. REV. 423, 450 
(2018). 
 104 New York still uses the Restatement (First) of Torts (First Restatement). See, e.g., Verizon N.Y. 
Inc. v. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 991 N.Y.S.2d 841, 853–54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (noting “courts 
applying New York law generally follow” the First Restatement and applying the First Restatement).  
 105 See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (providing when 
liability attaches for disclosure of trade secrets). The six factors are:  
(1) [T]he extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the ex-
tent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the ex-
tent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of 
the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money ex-
pended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the 
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.  
Id. § 757 cmt. b. 
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the factors is “the extent to which [the information] is known by employees 
and others involved in his business.”106 But trying to find the Exclusion in 
these factors leads to highly unsatisfying and even somewhat contradictory 
results.107 Indeed, the Restatement emphasizes that revealing a trade secret to 
employees does not necessarily destroy secrecy, stating that the employer 
“may, without losing his protection, communicate it to employees involved in 
its use.”108 Instead, courts that utilize this source of law have viewed the Ex-
clusion as a separate common law doctrine not encapsulated in the text of the 
First Restatement.109 
4. Turner’s Treatise (1962) 
When British lawyer and politician A. Edward Turner wrote his treatise 
on the law of trade secrets in 1962, case law addressing the General 
Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion in both England and America was 
extensive enough to warrant an independent section in Turner’s treatise.110 Be-
cause trade secret law at this time was still addressed exclusively by the com-
mon law in a multiplicity of states and because the First Restatement did not 
explicitly discuss the Exclusion, Turner’s extensive chapter on the Exclusion is 
an effective way to obtain a clear depiction of courts’ understanding of the Ex-
clusion circa 1962.111 
Three things are particularly important. First, Turner characterized the 
Exclusion as based on a public policy of protecting people’s right to pursue an 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Id. 
 107 The First Restatement makes clear that neither “[m]atters of public knowledge” nor matters 
“of general knowledge in an industry” can be protected as a trade secret. Id. Rather, a trade secret 
must “substantially” be known only within the “particular business in which it is used.” Id. The First 
Restatement’s second factor also specifically requires assessing “the extent to which [the alleged trade 
secret] is known by employees . . . involved in his business.” Id. Unsurprisingly, courts have not in-
terpreted the second factor as meaning information disclosed to employees may become excluded as 
“general knowledge, skill, and experience.” Rather, they see it as a direction to assess general secrecy 
and the trade secret holder’s security precautions with respect to employees. See, e.g., In re TXCO 
Res., Inc., 475 B.R. 781, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2012) (applying the First Restatement and finding, 
with respect to factors two and three, that “(2) only four people had access to the data and all were . . . 
agents or employees; (3) employees needed a security card to enter the work area and the data were 
kept in a vault accessible only to those who were given the combination”); see also, e.g., N. Atl. In-
struments, Inc. v. Haber, 188 F.3d 38, 44–46 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying the First Restatement under 
New York law and engaging in similar analysis). 
 108 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. 
 109 See, e.g., In re TXCO, 475 B.R. at 818 (discussing the exclusion separate from the First Re-
statement analysis). 
 110 See TURNER, supra note 45, at 115–72 (citing English and American cases holding general 
skill, knowledge, and experience cannot be protected). 
 111 There were other treatises at the time as well, but this has the best discussion of the Exclusion 
I have found. See, e.g., NIMS, supra note 97, §§ 141–161, at 402–44. 
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occupation even at the potential expense of protectable trade secrets.112 Sec-
ond, Turner saw the Exclusion as affecting contracts as well as trade secret 
protection.113 Third, and most significant in light of modern courts’ application 
of the Exclusion, Turner believed the Exclusion barred a trade secret from pro-
tection by way of what Turner called an “extraneous legal principle,”114 or a 
“third factor,” in the trade secret analysis that applies “when employee recipi-
ents of disclosures are concerned.”115 
Turner’s “extraneous legal principle” or “third factor” is what this Article 
calls the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion. Turner’s trea-
tise clearly shows that, at least under the common law as of 1962, the Exclu-
sion was seen as separate from, but also equivalent in legal importance to, the 
other elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case: proof of protectable subject mat-
ter and proof of misappropriation.116 
5. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995) 
Another trade secret source of law is the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition (Third Restatement). Drafted in 1995, the Third Restatement has 
not been as influential as other sources, with many courts instead continuing to 
reference the First Restatement even when not applying a trade secret statute. 
Unlike the First Restatement, however, the Third Restatement expressly identi-
fies the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion, explains the pol-
icy behind the doctrine, and depicts its full scope.117 The Third Restatement 
echoes much of Turner’s analysis, indicating that the Exclusion remained in-
tact despite the changes in trade secret law that occurred between 1962 and 
1995. 
The Third Restatement makes several key points. First, it sets up a di-
chotomy between protectable trade secrets and unprotectable general 
knowledge, skill, and experience. This creates the impression—which as dis-
cussed further in the next Part is only partially accurate—that the Exclusion is 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See TURNER, supra note 45, at 160 (describing at length the limitation on protection for “per-
sonal skill, knowledge and experience,” and asserting in the first heading: “Public Policy Protects a 
Person’s Livelihood at the Expense of Secrets Protectable per se”). 
 113 Id. at 120 (“It is submitted that there is no apparent difference in a court’s consideration of an 
employee’s covenant not to use or disclose knowledge, skill or experience, from its consideration of 
the limits to which the court by injunction will restrain such use and disclosure independently of cov-
enant.”). 
 114 Id. at 115 (“The purpose of this Chapter is to define what knowledge, information, skill and 
know-how which would otherwise be capable of protection because it is sufficiently secret . . . is un-
protectable because of an extraneous legal principle.”). 
 115 Id. at 160 (even once a trade secret is proven to exist and misappropriation is shown, “[h]owever, 
there is imposed on this two-fold requirement a third factor when employee recipients of disclosures 
are concerned”) (discussing American cases). 
 116 See id. 
 117 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42. 
2019] The General Knowledge Paradox 2429 
a subject matter bar.118 Second, it clarifies that information can be considered 
“general skill, knowledge, training, and experience of an employee” even if the 
information is “directly attributable to an investment of resources by the em-
ployer in the employee.”119 This means the Exclusion can potentially encom-
pass information that is otherwise entirely unknown to others in the industry120 
as well as information the employer, rather than the individual employee, gen-
erated.121 Third, the Third Restatement introduces the idea that information 
that might otherwise be a trade secret can lose its status once it becomes “so 
closely integrated” with an employee’s “overall employment experience that 
protection would deprive the employee of the ability to obtain employment 
commensurate with the employee’s general qualifications.”122 
C. Adoption of the Exclusion in Statutory Law 
Despite the Exclusion’s long roots in the common law, the Exclusion has 
not been explicitly codified in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1979, its state 
law analogues, or in the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) of 2016.123 This 
does not mean it is dead letter. To the contrary, the assumption has been that—
because the drafters of the UTSA unambiguously intended to codify the com-
mon law, and the drafters of the DTSA unambiguously intended to mimic the 
UTSA—the Exclusion is part of the modern trade secret law regime.124 The 
discussion below largely confirms this conception, but it also identifies several 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Id. § 42 cmt. d (“The distinction between trade secrets and general skill, knowledge, training, 
and experience is intended to achieve a reasonable balance between the protection of confidential 
information and the mobility of employees.”). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. (noting only that “[t]rade secret rights are more likely to be recognized in specialized in-
formation unique to the employer’s business than in information more widely known in the industry 
or derived from skills generally possessed by persons employed in the industry”) (emphasis added). 
 121 See id. (“The relative contribution of the employer and employee to the development of the 
information can also be relevant.”) (emphasis added). 
 122 Id. This idea also appeared in some prior cases, such as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
1985 decision in SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley. See 753 F.2d at 1262. 
 123 See UTSA §§ 1–12; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836–1839. The South Carolina Trade Secrets Act—which 
is one of few acts that makes somewhat significant alterations to the UTSA—is the only state act I 
saw that potentially even alludes to the Exclusion. The code states that “[t]he collective effect of the 
items and procedures [claimed as trade secrets] must be considered in any analysis of whether a trade 
secret exists and not the general knowledge of each individual item or procedure.” S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-8-20(5)(b) (2019) (emphasis added). This reference to “general knowledge,” however, almost 
certainly refers to only the secrecy requirement, not to any employee’s general knowledge. At least 
one court interpreted this language to mean that a “trade secret may exist in a unique combination or 
compilation of information otherwise publicly available.” UHLIG LLC v. Shirley, No. 6:08-cv-
01208-JMC, 2012 WL 2923242, at *5 (D.S.C. July 17, 2012). This simply codifies the standard rule 
that a secret “combination” of publicly known elements can be protected. ROWE, TRADE SECRET 
LAW, supra note 27, at 78. 
 124 Indeed, the Third Restatement’s extensive treatment of the Exclusion in 1995 itself confirms 
this. 
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possible sources of confusion in the statutory text. As will be shown in the next 
Part, this may well be affecting the way courts apply the Exclusion in the case 
law today.125 
1. Uniform Trade Secrets Act of 1979 
In 1979, the Uniform Law Commission went further towards codification 
of trade secret law than ever before by drafting the UTSA, which was gradual-
ly adopted by all states except New York.126 Some commentators locate the 
source of the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion in the 
UTSA and its commentary.127 But the drafters do not actually mention the Ex-
clusion, so where is it?128 It turns out that finding the Exclusion in the UTSA 
takes a bit of imagination and a lot of reliance on the UTSA’s purported fideli-
ty to common law. 
As an initial matter, the Prefatory Note to the UTSA states that it “codifies 
the basic principles of common law trade secret protection, preserving its es-
sential distinctions from patent law.”129 Yet, the structure is quite different from 
the First Restatement.130 The UTSA eschews the factor-based analysis and re-
moves old reference points. Instead, the UTSA provides certain criteria that a 
trade secret must meet to be protectable. The UTSA defines a trade secret as: 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not 
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value 
from its disclosure or use, and 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See infra notes 207–373 and accompanying text. 
 126 See Trade Secrets Act, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/
community-home?communitykey=3a2538fb-e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792&tab=groupdetails [https://
perma.cc/C4JS-8A82] (listing all states except New York as passing the UTSA). 
 127 Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade 
Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 867–68 (2017) (“Much of this common law is . . . reflected 
in both the text and commentary to the UTSA, including the common law rules that trade secrets do 
not include the general skill and knowledge of an employee . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 128 UTSA, Prefatory Note (“Under both the Act and common law principles, for example, more 
than one person can be entitled to trade secret protection with respect to the same information, and 
analysis involving the ‘reverse engineering’ of a lawfully obtained product in order to discover a trade 
secret is permissible.”).  
 129 Id.; see also Risch, supra note 96, at 156. There were some differences, such as the UTSA’s 
abandonment of the First Restatement’s requirement that a trade secret be used in a business and the 
UTSA’s introduction of the concept of “threatened” misappropriation. Risch, supra note 96, at 156. 
But none of these differences bear directly on protectability of employee skill, knowledge, and experi-
ence. 
 130 Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (defining the six factors for determin-
ing if something is a trade secret), with UTSA § 1(4) (defining a trade secret). 
2019] The General Knowledge Paradox 2431 
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circum-
stances to maintain its secrecy.131 
The italicized portion is the only statement with any bearing on the Exclu-
sion.132 This provision requires a trade secret to be “not generally known” or 
not “readily ascertainable” to “other persons” who could obtain economic val-
ue from it. 
In deciding whether this requirement implicitly directs courts to exclude 
an employee’s General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience from protection, the 
key question is whether the “other persons” includes the employer’s own em-
ployees. Obviously, employees can be, and indeed in many cases are, “other 
persons who can obtain economic value from [a secret’s] disclosure or use.”133 
This is why the employees in many trade secret cases are leaving to start their 
own company or to take a job with another employer, sometimes for better 
pay.134 It is unlikely, however, that the UTSA completely ignored the principle 
expressed in common law and in the First Restatement that an employer can 
carefully communicate secrets to employees without losing protection.135 In-
terpreting the “other persons” as referring to employees would effectively do 
this, implying that whenever a secret becomes “generally known” or “readily 
ascertainable” to one’s own employees, it is no longer a trade secret. 
“Other persons” must, instead, refer only to people outside of the trade 
secret owner’s company. It would, in other words, comport with prior common 
law decisions interpreting “secrecy” as meaning neither publicly disclosed in 
patents, publications, or products nor “common knowledge in the trade.”136 
The UTSA commentary also supports this view, explaining that the “not gen-
erally known” language is intended to exclude information that “may be un-
                                                                                                                           
 131 UTSA § 1(4) (emphasis added). 
 132 The reasonable efforts requirement is for the most part a separate issue, addressing whether the 
plaintiff took sufficient steps to keep the information secret. See the discussion of the connection to 
the Exclusion in Part II. See infra notes 151–206 and accompanying text. 
 133 See UTSA § 1(4)(i). 
 134 Levandowski, for instance, got a job at Uber and a promised earn out payment of nearly $680 
million for his start-up. Am. Compl., supra note 1, ¶¶ 5, 7, 55. 
 135 See Nat’l Tube Co., 13 Ohio C.D. at 472 (defining a trade secret as necessarily being shared 
with an employee for the employer’s use); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (explaining 
trade secrets do not lose protection when shared with employees). 
 136 See, e.g., A.F. Holden Co. v. O’Brien, No. 6263, 1947 WL 3545, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 
1947) (“The plaintiff’s formulae for the heat treating salts . . . . are not exactly secret, because their 
physical and chemical composition can be and no doubt has been ascertained by competent and ana-
lytical chemists, though I do not think it can be said that they are common knowledge in the trade.”); 
Gate-Way, Inc. v. Wilson, 94 Cal. App. 2d 706, 710 (1949) (“All the individual parts installed in 
plaintiff’s plant were combined to accomplish the process of coating door knob sets and the combina-
tion is the subject of common knowledge, is in the public domain, and is disclosed in detail in patents, 
trade publications, catalogues and photographs.”); see also Gabriel Co. v. Talley Indus., No. 3248-
PHX, 1963 WL 8129, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 4, 1963) (finding no trade secrets); Cornell-Dubilier Elec. 
Corp. v. Aerovox Corp., Eq. No. 3043, 1946 WL 3275, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 1946) (same). 
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known to the general public” but is “readily known within the [relevant] indus-
try.”137 
This raises a very important point. The UTSA’s broadening of the secrecy 
requirement to include situations where the secret becomes known to others in 
the industry cannot be viewed as comprehensive of the Exclusion. It is possible 
that information can be completely secret to the plaintiff employer, not known 
to others within the industry, but nonetheless unprotectable based on the Ex-
clusion.138 Given that the UTSA “codifies the basic principles of common law 
trade secret protection” and says nothing to the contrary, it stands to reason the 
Exclusion came along with the rest of the common law.139 This is what courts 
have assumed in continuing to cite and apply it with frequency.140 
Nonetheless, the UTSA’s (and the First Restatement’s) ambiguity may 
nonetheless have done lasting damage to the integrity of the Exclusion. Many 
courts now conflate the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion 
with the UTSA’s requirement that information be “not generally known” or 
“readily ascertainable” to others in the industry, even though this is almost cer-
tainly not what the drafters of the UTSA intended. 
2. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 
The major source of law for trade secrets in the United States is a federal 
statute, the DTSA, codified in Title 18 of the U.S. Code.141 The DTSA amend-
ed the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 to create a new federal civil (as op-
posed to only criminal) remedy for trade secret misappropriation.142 The 
DTSA, by its own terms, adopts the UTSA’s definition of a “trade secret” and 
the UTSA’s definition of “misappropriation” and “improper means.”143 The 
                                                                                                                           
 137 UTSA § 1 cmt. The comments state that “[i]f the principal persons who can obtain economic 
benefit from information are aware of it, there is no trade secret. A method of casting metal, for ex-
ample, may be unknown to the general public but readily known within the foundry industry.” Id. 
Under the amended UTSA of 1985, the comments modified “principal person” to “principal persons.” 
Id. (emphasis added). This suggests one person (e.g., one single defendant employee) knowing the 
information would be insufficient. In addition, the example provided in the comments is of a method 
for casting metal that is well known by people “within the foundry industry.” Id. (emphasis added). 
These points suggest that the UTSA meant information loses status as a trade secret once it becomes 
generally known to other persons in the industry outside the company, not just employees within the 
company. 
 138 See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 45, at 115 (describing the Exclusion as an “extraneous legal 
principle”). 
 139 See UTSA, Prefatory Note. 
 140 See supra note 70 (summarizing relevant case law).  
 141 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836–1839; see also David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at 
One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 133, 153 & n.290 (2018). 
 142 H.R. REP. NO. 114–529, at 1–2 (2016). 
 143 See id. at 2 (explaining that the DTSA models “misappropriation” off the UTSA definition); 
see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1839(3), (5), (6) (defining “misappropriation,” “trade secret,” and “improper 
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DTSA does not preempt state law claims, meaning both can be brought togeth-
er.144 It also does not confer jurisdiction exclusively to the federal courts so 
trade secret plaintiffs can choose between state and federal court.145 
Although it would have been desirable for the DTSA to expressly address 
the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion, like its predecessors, 
the DTSA does so only obliquely. The most relevant provision affecting the 
Exclusion appears in the remedy provision. Like the UTSA, the DTSA pro-
vides that a court may grant an injunction “to prevent any actual or threatened 
misappropriation . . . on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”146 DTSA 
§ 1836(b)(3) states that the order may not “prevent a person from entering into 
an employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such employment 
shall be based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on 
the information the person knows.”147 This statutory provision means courts 
hearing DTSA claims may not grant an injunction that would prevent someone 
from taking a new job. If courts do grant an injunction affecting an employ-
ment relationship, any “conditions” placed on that employment need to be 
based on “evidence of threatened misappropriation,” such as actions in prepa-
ration to use or disclose trade secrets. 
The legislative history confirms the provision was based on the perceived 
“importance of employment mobility.”148 This limitation on remedies thus in-
vokes a similar public policy principle as the Exclusion, both seeking not to 
interfere with peoples’ right to take on new work. More specifically, the 
change was made in response to concerns that the DTSA, as initially written, 
“implicitly recognize[d] the so-called inevitable disclosure doctrine.”149 The 
connection to the Exclusion is obvious. An “inevitable disclosure” injunction 
allows a trade secret owner to enjoin a departing employee based on the possi-
bility that the employee might “inevitably rely on” trade secrets at a new job 
that entails similar duties.150 Meanwhile, the Exclusion seeks to protect em-
ployees from such after-the-fact restraints, by mandating that certain kinds of 
information known to an employee cannot be protected as a trade secret at all. 
                                                                                                                           
means”). The definition of improper means expressly excludes proper means like independent devel-
opment and reverse engineering. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6). 
 144 Id. § 1838.  
 145 Id. § 1836(c). 
 146 Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i). 
 147 Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I). 
 148 See S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016) (“Section (3)(A)(i)(1)(I) reinforces the importance of 
employment mobility and contains some limitations on injunctive relief that may be ordered.”). 
 149 Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 127, at 857 (quoting Letter from Eric Goldman et al., Professors 
of Law, to Charles E. Grassley, Chairperson, U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 17, 2015)), https://
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%20Opposition%20to%20DTSA
%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK3D-WVDF]. 
 150 See generally PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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Clearly, the DTSA’s limitation on the remedial measures is closely related 
to the policy goals behind the exclusion. At the very least, DTSA defendants 
can rely on § 1836(b)(3)’s limitations to argue for a more limited injunction 
when their new job is implicated. This is not the same as an express recogni-
tion of the General Skill, Knowledge, and Experience Exclusion. But, when 
combined with the DTSA’s intentional duplication of the UTSA, which in turn 
intentionally codified the common law, the DTSA’s expression of such similar 
public policy concerns indicates the Exclusion has indeed been imported into 
the DTSA. Defendants can continue to invoke it under federal law and the law 
of the relevant state. 
II. THE GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, SKILL, AND EXPERIENCE EXCLUSION’S 
NORMATIVE ROLE IN TRADE SECRET LAW 
This Part provides a much-needed normative account of the Exclusion by 
explaining what the Exclusion should do based on historical practice and 
sound policy. This Part is a necessary prelude to Part III, which utilizes this 
normative framework to derive the legal doctrine that courts should apply in 
actual cases where the Exclusion arises. Section A details the policy rationales 
that drive trade secret law.151 Section B discusses trade secret law’s goal of 
facilitating communication between employers and their employees.152 Section 
C explains how the Exclusion mitigates the costs trade secret law imposes on 
workers who receive trade secrets in the course of their employment.153 
A. The Policy Rationales for Trade Secret Law  
The policy rationales for the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience 
Exclusion can only be understood as a counterpoint to the policy rationales for 
trade secret protection itself. There are several reasons courts and legislatures 
have come, over time, to protect trade secrets. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1974 
decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. includes all of the standard trade 
secret justifications.154 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See infra notes 154–163 and accompanying text. 
 152 See infra notes 164–184 and accompanying text. 
 153 See infra notes 185–206 and accompanying text. 
 154 416 U.S. 470, 491–92 (1974). Specifically, the Court held that Ohio’s trade secret law of the 
time was not preempted by patent law. Id.; see also Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret 
Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 260–96 (1998) (reviewing justifica-
tions based on “efficiency,” “rights and fairness,” and “industry norms”); Mark A. Lemley, The Sur-
prising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 335–36 (2008) [herein-
after Lemley, The Surprising Virtues]; Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 26–35 (2007) (detailing trade secret justifications). 
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First, trade secret law is thought, by most accounts, to safeguard standards 
of commercial morality and to deter breaches of a duty of confidence.155 Sec-
ond, trade secret protection is thought to reward and encourage investments in 
developing a wide variety of information, such as technical information, busi-
ness processes, marketing data, and detailed customer lists.156 This incentive to 
invest argument is often linked with patent law,157 but it protects much more 
than potentially patentable inventions.158 Third, trade secret law is said, ironi-
cally, to facilitate “disclosure” of information.159 Whereas patent law is thought 
to encourage public disclosure in patent specifications, trade secret law is 
thought to encourage disclosures between firms and within firms.160 
Lastly, underlying all of these rationales, is an efficiency argument. The 
efficiency argument states that trade secret law reduces the costs of “self-help” 
that companies would otherwise incur if trade secret protections were abol-
ished.161 The efficiency argument, which is often invoked to bolster the incen-
                                                                                                                           
 155 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485 (1974) (“The maintenance of standards 
of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies behind trade 
secret law.”); see also E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) 
(“The word ‘property’ as applied to . . . trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary 
consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. . . . 
Therefore the starting point . . . is not property . . . but that the defendant stood in confidential rela-
tions with the [employer].”); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 
(5th Cir. 1970) (applying Texas law and holding aerial photography of a plant under construction 
violated “recognize[d] . . . standards of commercial morality in the business world” (quoting Hyde 
Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763, 773 (Tex. 1958))). But see Bone, supra note 154, at 294–96 (cri-
tiquing the argument that a major purpose of trade secret law is to enforce industry norms). 
 156 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trade Secrecy Law, in THE ECO-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 354–71 (William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner eds., 2003). But see Bone, supra note 154, at 262 & n.94 (asserting that although the “incen-
tive-based argument is one of the most frequently invoked” today, it is relatively new and “had little 
explicit impact on the development of trade secret doctrine in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury”).  
 157 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 156, at 356–63 (discussing the choice between trade 
secrets and patents). 
 158 “Trade secret law,” the Supreme Court stated, “encourages the development and exploitation 
of those items of lesser or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws, 
but which items still have an important part to play in the technological and scientific advancement of 
the Nation.” Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 493. 
 159 Lemley, The Surprising Virtues, supra note 154, at 313 (“I argue that, paradoxically, trade 
secret law actually encourages disclosure, not secrecy.”). 
 160 Id. at 333–36 (arguing trade secret laws can “encourage disclosure” and facilitate efficient 
market exchanges of information); see also Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 486 (holding without trade se-
cret protection “[t]he result would be to hoard rather than disseminate knowledge”). 
 161 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 485–86 (“Even if trade secret protection against the faithless 
employee were abolished, inventive and exploitive effort in the area of patentable subject matter that 
did not meet the standards of patentability would continue, although at a reduced level. Alternatively 
with the effort that remained, however, would come an increase in the amount of self-help that inno-
vative companies would employ.”); e.g., Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, supra note 154, at 
43–44 (arguing that without trade secret protections, owners would be forced to resort to “self-help” 
measures).  
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tive to innovate and incentive to disclose rationales, goes as follows. Surely, 
one might argue, investments in innovation and exchanges of information are 
possible even without trade secret law, especially since companies could still 
rely on use of robust contractual restrictions.162 But commentators assert these 
activities would be more expensive, necessitating more physical and contrac-
tual precautions and would introduce significant inefficiencies into business 
activity, without the chance for a trade secret injunction.163 
B. Trade Secret Law’s Special Focus on Facilitating  
Sharing with Employees 
The “incentive to disclose” argument, just stated, is often linked to the so-
called Arrow Information Paradox (Paradox).164 The Paradox observes that 
parties cannot efficiently buy and sell information without valuing it, but the 
parties cannot value it without the seller having to disclose it to the buyer, 
thereby risking it being acquired without cost.165 The argument encompasses 
far more than the usual buyer-seller context, however, and it implicates all 
kinds of productive exchanges that theoretically could not occur without legal 
protection. 
One of the most important type of exchanges that trade secret law is be-
lieved to facilitate is productive sharing of information between employers and 
employees. Indeed, this is arguably the most important type of sharing ex-
change that trade secret law facilitates because a significant majority of trade 
secret disputes involve departing employees who are accused of taking infor-
mation they lawfully obtained in the course of employment—not putative buy-
ers, business partners, licensors, or hackers.166 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Bone, supra note 154, at 247 (arguing “most” of trade secret law’s “benefits are better 
achieved through contract”); cf. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 485–86 (discussing the disadvantages that 
would follow abolishment of trade secret laws).  
 163 See, e.g., Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, supra note 154, at 44 (“Contract law alone 
does not allow for a solution to maximize efficiency.”). 
 164 See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 227, 228–29 (2012) (introducing Arrow’s information paradox); Camilla A. Hrdy, Commer-
cialization Awards, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 30 (discussing Arrow’s information paradox’s relevance to 
patent and trade secret theory); Lemley, The Surprising Virtues, supra note 154, at 336 (“Trade secret 
laws . . . serve as a partial solution to Arrow’s Information Paradox.”). 
 165 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE 
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).  
 166 Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 27, at 15. In the DTSA’s first year, “two-thirds of all 
cases filed . . . involve[d] a current or former employee.” Id. (citing Levine & Seaman, supra note 
141, at 146). 
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1. Employer-Employee Disclosures 
Facilitating informational exchanges between employers and employees 
is a crucial justification for trade secret law’s existence. This is implicit in the 
historical trajectory of the law, with trade secret protection arising in the Indus-
trial Revolution. At this time the workplace was shifting from the master-
apprentice context to large-scale production in which many employees outside 
of one’s family or circle of acquaintances were exposed to trade secrets.167 
Employer-employee disclosures implicate more than concrete secrets that em-
ployers must, by necessity, share with employees, like production processes, 
technical blue-prints, and major client lists.168 Additionally, such disclosures 
include those necessary for employers to effectively train their employees who 
need to learn how to operate new equipment and internal software, and how to 
carry out any number of specialized tasks and procedures that are part of what 
makes a company more productive than its peers.169 The “training” in this con-
text is not any different from other forms of sharing—it is just the delivery ve-
hicle for imparting trade secrets.170 
The Supreme Court in Kewanee explained why disclosures of trade se-
crets to employees must be sacrosanct, specifically invoking the cost-reduction 
theory described above.171 If employer-employee disclosures meant sacrificing 
trade secret protection, the Court wrote, “inventive and exploitive effort . . . 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See supra notes 63–150 and accompanying text; see also SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 
753 F.2d 1244, 1265 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[M]odern economic growth and development has pushed the 
business venture beyond the size of the one-man firm, forcing the businessman to a much greater 
degree to entrust confidential business information relating to technological development to appropri-
ate employees.”).  
 168 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 175 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(discussing employer’s need to share technical information related to manufacturing); Rohm & Haas 
Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 1982) (examining the need to share details of the 
production process); Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1282–83 (Vt. 2001) (holding a customer list, 
even when shared, can be a trade secret). 
 169 The incentive to train argument is usually discussed with respect to non-competes, but it ap-
plies equally here. See, e.g., Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 35, at 3 (“[N]oncompetes induce a firm 
to finance training that the employee cannot self-finance in the form of reduced wages.”); Evan P. 
Starr, Consider This: Training Wages, and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 COR-
NELL INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 783, 785 (2019) (formerly titled Training the Enemy? Firm-Sponsored 
Training and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete) (finding that employers invest more in 
training employees in states that enforce covenants not to compete); see also Orkin Exterminating Co. 
v. Foti, 302 So.2d 593, 595 (La. 1974) (discussing Louisiana’s exception to ban on non-competes 
“where the employer incurs an expense in the training of an employee” (citing LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 23:921 (1962))). 
 170 Morgan’s Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 136 A.2d 838, 846 (Pa. 1957) (“An employe [sic] 
may receive specialized training and skills, and learn the carefully guarded methods of doing business 
which are the trade secrets of a particular enterprise.”); see also Graves, Common Law Confidentiality, 
supra note 76, at 86–87 (discussing situations where “training” of employees is used as a justification 
for post-employment restrictions). 
 171 See 416 U.S. at 486. 
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would continue,” but “at a reduced level,” and with inefficiencies introduced in 
the form of “self-help” and unproductive restructuring of the research pro-
cess.172 The Court speculated that even employee compensation might be af-
fected, with companies favoring only those employees whose commitment to 
the company they could ensure through salaries and benefits.173 Indeed, a ma-
jor trade secret treatise goes so far as to suggest that, without the ability to pro-
tect trade secrets disclosed to employees, employers might not feel safe hiring 
employees at all, thereby reducing the job opportunities available for workers.174 
2. How Trade Secret Doctrines Shield Employer-Employee Disclosures 
Trade secret law’s goal to facilitate employer-employee disclosures is 
crystallized in the law’s secrecy rules, discussed in Part I, which do not count 
“controlled disclosures” to employees as a secrecy-destroying event.175 As the 
Supreme Court put it in Kewanee, discussing Ohio’s trade secret law at the 
time: 
[S]ecrecy is not lost . . . if the holder of the trade secret reveals the 
trade secret to another “in confidence, and under an implied obliga-
tion not to use or disclose it.”176 These others may include those of 
                                                                                                                           
 172 Id. The Court further observed, “As a result, organized scientific and technological research 
could become fragmented, and society, as a whole, would suffer.” Id. 
 173 Id. The Court speculated about several adverse consequences that could ensue:  
Knowledge would be widely dispersed among the employees of those still active in re-
search. Security precautions necessarily would be increased, and salaries and fringe 
benefits of those few officers or employees who had to know the whole of the secret in-
vention would be fixed in an amount thought sufficient to assure their loyalty. Smaller 
companies would be placed at a distinct economic disadvantage, since the costs of this 
kind of self-help could be great, and the cost to the public of the use of this invention 
would be increased. The innovative entrepreneur with limited resources would tend to 
confine his research efforts to himself and those few he felt he could trust without the 
ultimate assurance of legal protection against breaches of confidence.  
Id.  
 174 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 69, at § 5.02[2] (asserting that an “employer-
owner’s claim to protection of proprietary trade secrets disclosed to or learned by an employee in the 
course of employment can be justified,” inter alia, because it “permits job opportunities and employ-
ment stability”). 
 175 See supra notes 63–150 and accompanying text; see also UTSA § 1, cmt (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1985) (“[R]easonable use of a trade secret including controlled disclosure to employees and 
licensees is consistent with the requirement of relative secrecy.”); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (providing trade secret protection is not destroyed when 
secrets are shared with employees).  
 176 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 475 (quoting Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. 
Reprint 154, 156 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1887)).  
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the holder’s “employees to whom it is necessary to confide it, in or-
der to apply it to the uses for which it is intended.”177 
Employer-employee sharing is further supported at a more granular level 
by the law’s “reasonable efforts” requirement, which requires a trade secret 
owner to take reasonable secrecy precautions to preserve the secrecy of 
claimed trade secrets, but does not, as a general matter, prevent employers 
from sharing information with employees.178 Indeed, in Judge Posner’s view, 
employers should be encouraged to share with employees where it is efficient 
to do so.179 A caveat is that employees are supposed to receive sufficient “no-
tice” that information is a trade secret that is intended to be kept confiden-
tial.180 Providing notice is not necessarily difficult to do as “employees can be 
notified by the simple act of delivering a piece of paper.”181 
More broadly, the reasonable efforts and duty of confidentiality require-
ments are inherently limited in their ability to protect employees from over-
protection. The problem is that so long as employers do take legally sufficient 
efforts to protect their trade secrets as against their own employees, the law per-
mits them to do so.182 In many real-world situations, employers provide exten-
sive notice to employees—constantly telling them through confidentiality ledg-
ers, security guards, exit interviews, and use of “clean rooms” to partition off 
sensitive hires—that the information they are receiving is confidential, proprie-
tary, and protected trade secrets.183 Can all of this information be protected, so 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Id. (quoting Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 13 Ohio C.D. 468, 470 (1902)). 
 178 UTSA § 1; 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2018); see also Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 179 
(“[W]hat is a ‘reasonable’ precaution . . . depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that will vary 
from case to case . . . .”). 
 179 Rockwell Graphic Sys., 925 F.2d at 180 (“[R]econfigurations of patterns of work and produc-
tion are far from costless; and therefore perfect security is not optimum security.”). 
 180 See Robert G. Bone, Trade Secrecy, Innovation, and the Requirement of Reasonable Secrecy 
Precautions, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY, supra note 76, at 46, 49–50, 59–60 [herein-
after Bone, Reasonable Secrecy Precautions] (discussing the argument that reasonable secrecy precau-
tions provide “notice” to employees that information is meant to be kept secret); see also Elizabeth A. 
Rowe, Contributory Negligence, Technology, and Trade Secrets, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 11–12 
(2009) [hereinafter Rowe, Contributory Negligence] (discussing various ways courts consider providing 
proper notice to employees in assessing reasonable efforts). 
 181 Bone, Reasonable Secrecy Precautions, supra note 180, at 59. 
 182 The best example is the blanket non-disclosure agreement providing that essentially every-
thing learned on the job is a trade secret. See Varadarajan, Trade Secret-Contract Interface, supra note 
27, at 1560–63 (observing the role of a generalized non-disclosure agreement in satisfying the reason-
able efforts requirement); see also David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 80–83 (2011) (showing courts almost always assess 
whether plaintiff used a confidentiality contract). 
 183 Cundiff, Maximum Security, supra note 39, at 307–11 (advising employers to utilize an array 
of protective measures). 
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long as it is generally unknown outside the company and has been the subject 
of sufficient effort on the employer’s part to keep in secret?184 
The answer must be no. Even though multiple facets of trade secret doc-
trine preserve employers’ ability to mindfully disclose trade secrets to employ-
ees without losing protection, there needs to be an additional layer of protec-
tion for employees on the receiving side of these exchanges. 
C. The Need for an Outlet: Trade Secret Law’s Exclusion of Employees’ 
General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience 
The General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion is an equitable 
doctrine that has evolved precisely to mitigate the costs trade secret law im-
poses on workers who receive trade secrets in the course of employment. This 
is where the paradox discussed in the Article’s title enters. Employers are told 
that they can disclose trade secrets to employees without losing protection, but 
that doing so will potentially destroy their ability to protect that information if 
it becomes a part of their employees’ general knowledge, skill, and experience. 
This Part argues that the paradox is necessary for trade secret law to work.185 
Some spillage of trade secrets to employees is justified based on two related 
but distinct policy concerns.186 
1. The Individual Employee’s Right to Work, Improve, and Move 
First, and most importantly, the Exclusion exists to protect individual 
workers from the harsh circumstance that because they were exposed to their 
employer’s trade secrets, they may later be restricted in their ability to work 
elsewhere. When the trade secret plaintiff seeks an “activity injunction”187 to 
restrict an employee’s ability to assume new employment responsibilities 
elsewhere, trade secret law becomes like “any form of post-employment re-
straint.”188 It “reduces the economic mobility of employees and limits their 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (defining a trade secret as requiring “reasonable measures” to keep it 
secret and “not being generally known”). 
 185 See infra notes 186–206 and accompanying text. 
 186 Cf. Pedraza-Farina, supra note 27, at 1599 (arguing that “employee migration” to other firms 
“generates important knowledge spillovers as employees transfer ideas and crucial know-how to other 
local firms”). 
 187 Victoria Cundiff et al., Getting the Remedy Just Right: Making Sure That “Equitable” Relief 
Really Is, 13–15, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE (Dec. 2017), https://thesedonaconference.org/sites/
default/files/conference_papers/%5B2.2%5D%20V.%20Cundiff%20et%20al_Getting%20the%20R
emedy%20Just%20Right%20Making%20Sure%20that%20Equitable%20Relief%20Really%20Is_
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/CCY9-TAPP] (discussing key issues in granting “activity injunctions” 
especially as regards employees).  
 188 SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 435 (Pa. 
1960)). 
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personal freedom to pursue a preferred course of livelihood.”189 This situation 
is caused precisely by the sharing exchange that trade law is designed to facili-
tate. While employers can certainly complain the Exclusion creates a paradox 
for them, the employee is subjected to a paradox first. As the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court put it in the 1960 case of Wexler v. Greenburg, “paradoxically,” 
the employee who receives his employer’s trade secrets “is restrained, because 
of his increased expertise, from advancing further in the industry in which he 
is most productive.”190 
The General Knowledge Skill, and Experience Exclusion mitigates this 
imposition on the employee by creating a counter-imposition on the employer, 
thereby denying the employer protection in situations where doing so would 
deprive the employee of the ability to use his or her newly enhanced skills and 
knowledge in new pursuits.191 The Exclusion thus mandates that courts balance 
the two parties’ interests: the employer’s need to protect trade secrets, on the one 
hand, and the employee’s need to pursue fruitful occupation, on the other.192 
The Exclusion is also supported by contract theory. As a general matter, 
people are supposed to be free to enter into mutually beneficial contracts.193 
                                                                                                                           
 189Id.; see, e.g., Morgan’s Home Equip., 136 A.2d at 846 (“[Covenants not to compete impose 
hardships on a]n employe [sic] [who] is prevented from practicing his trade or skill, or from utilizing 
his experience in the particular type of work with which he is familiar. He may encounter difficulty in 
transferring his particular experience and training to another line of work, and hence his ability to earn 
a livelihood is seriously impaired.”); see also Lobel, New Cognitive Property, supra note 76, at 848 
(discussing the “deadweight loss” that human capital laws can place on workers who “risk their very 
liberty to move through their careers”); cf. Viva R. Moffat, Human Capital as Intellectual Property? 
Non-Competes and the Limits of IP Protection, 50 AKRON L. REV. 903, 926 (2016) [hereinafter 
Moffat, Human Capital] (“[T]he affected employee may be unable to work in her chosen field or in 
the location where she resides for some significant period of time.”). 
 190 Wexler, 160 A.2d at 435; see also SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1265 (quoting the same lan-
guage). 
 191 SI Handling Sys., 735 F.2d at 1267–68 (Adams, J., concurring); see, e.g., AMP Inc. v. 
Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1205 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding “general skills and knowledge . . . are 
things an employee is free to take and to use in later pursuits” (quoting Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 
611 F. Supp. 507, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1985))); Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 412 (3d Cir. 
1961) (“[A]n employee after leaving the service of an employer may carry on the same business on 
his own and use for his own benefits the things he has learned while in the earlier employment.”); see 
also Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge, supra note 27, at 408 (“If employees could not safely 
transfer their training and skills from job to job . . . they would be unable to change jobs within the 
same field or start new, competing businesses.”). 
 192 CALLMANN, supra note 26 (asserting that distinguishing a trade secret from general 
knowledge, skill, and experience “is an issue which can only be resolved by a balancing of the con-
flicting social and economic interests which are associated with two desirable goals”—employee 
mobility and protection against unfair business practices); see, e.g., Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 992 
P.2d 175, 187 (Idaho 1999) (“Trade secret misappropriation law inherently involves balancing be-
tween the competing interests of employers and employees.”).  
 193 See, e.g., Watertown Thermometer Co. v. Pool, 4 N.Y.S. 861, 862–63 (Gen. Term 1889) 
(holding “public policy and the interests of society favor the utmost freedom of contract”); see also 
TURNER, supra note 45, at 115 (“Where contracts are concerned, two principles of law conflict: the 
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This is exactly what occurs when an employee enters an employment relation-
ship. The employee agrees to provide the employer with certain services by 
applying existing skills, knowledge, and experience to specified tasks on be-
half of the employer.194 In exchange, the employee receives a salary, benefits, 
and the opportunity to learn from the employer further skills, knowledge, and 
experiences. The exchange is by necessity a two-way street. The employee, 
especially if already exceptionally skilled, can be expected to impart infor-
mation to the employer. Meanwhile, the employer can be expected to impart 
knowledge, skill, and training to the employee that he or she did not have be-
fore. 
Indeed, this proviso is sometimes stated explicitly in employment con-
tracts, and is referred to as a “residual knowledge clause.” For example, in Ho-
gan Systems, Inc. v. Cybresource International, Inc., a 1997 case before the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, the employee had signed 
a confidentiality agreement that stated the employee would not use or disclose 
the employer’s trade secrets.195 But the agreement expressly included a caveat 
that the “[e]mployee will accrue general knowledge, skill and experience dur-
ing the course of his or her employment which may be of benefit to, and used 
by, Employee in other employment situations following separation from 
[plaintiff employer].”196 Even when there is no such clause, the General 
Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion imposes this same obligation as a 
default by holding that trade secret law cannot be used to protect this type of 
“residual knowledge,” or at least not unless the employee waives it in an oth-
erwise enforceable contract.  
If the employee does not contractually waive the right to obtain new 
knowledge, skill, and experience on the job, however, trade secret law may not 
be used to effectively force the employee into such an agreement after the 
                                                                                                                           
principle of freedom of trade and the principle of freedom of contract.”); Varadarajan, Trade Secret-
Contract Interface, supra note 27, at 1576 (discussing freedom of contract argument). 
 194 This is sometimes called “human capital.” CHRISTINE GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNO-
VATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 229 (2010) (“The term human capital 
is defined as all the knowledge, education, training, and experience that is embodied in workers.”); see 
also Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
683, 684 (1980) (discussing forms of human capital); Lobel, New Cognitive Property, supra note 76, 
at 794 (discussing definitions of “knowledge” as they relate to “human capital law”). 
 195 No. 3:96-CV-2083-H, 1997 WL 311526, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 1997), aff’d, 158 F.3d 319 
(5th Cir. 1998).  
 196 Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holding, finding 
that the claimed secrets constituted “general knowledge, skill, and experience” which the defendants 
“garnered as a result of their former employment with [plaintiff], and which their Confidentiality 
Agreements . . . recognized as not being a trade secret.” Hogan Sys., Inc. v. Cybresource Int’l, Inc., 
158 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
1979 (2016). 
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fact.197 So, for example, commentators like Edmund Kitch have argued that 
employees should be free to negotiate employment contracts in which they 
agree not to compete for a certain period after departure, because this enables 
employers to “finance” the employee’s training, secure in the knowledge the 
employee cannot simply leave to work for a competitor without repaying the 
“loan.”198 This may be well and good—at least in states that enforce such non-
compete agreements.199 But the freedom of contract argument does not work if 
the employee has not signed a non-compete contract and negotiated a mutually 
beneficial agreement with the employer.200 The Exclusion thus prevents em-
ployers from using trade secret law to force employees into non-compete obli-
gations to which they never agreed. In this sense, the Exclusion parallels the 
reluctance of courts in some states to grant injunctions based on the argument 
that an employee will inevitably disclose a former employer’s trade secrets.201 
2. Economic Justifications for Employee Mobility 
Second, the Exclusion is sometimes said to serve a public interest in em-
ployee mobility and to contribute, on aggregate, to productivity, innovation, 
and economic growth. While the first rationale centers around preserving indi-
viduals’ rights to work and improve in productive employment exchanges, this 
second rationale centers around sound economic policy. As one oft-cited Mas-
sachusetts opinion puts it, the right of an employee to use his or her “‘general 
knowledge, experience, memory and skill’ . . . promotes the public interest in 
labor mobility and the employee’s freedom to practice his profession and in 
mitigating monopoly. The law thus maximizes the benefit of the national store 
of skill and knowledge.”202 
                                                                                                                           
 197 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995) 
(“[A]bsent an enforceable covenant not to compete, a former employee may utilize in competition 
with the former employer the general skills, knowledge, training, and experience acquired during the 
employment . . . .”). 
 198 Kitch, supra note 194, at 685. 
 199 See supra notes 73, 76 (discussing California’s ban of non-compete agreements). 
 200 See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1258–59 (“SI did not require such covenants from its 
employees, and cannot now through the medium of trade secrets law prevent them from exploiting 
their . . . contacts.”). 
 201 This is sometimes called the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine. Compare PepsiCo, Inc. v. Red-
mond, 54 F. 3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the doctrine exists in Illinois law), with 
Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 281 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine is “contrary to California law and policy because it creates an after-the-fact cove-
nant not to compete restricting employee mobility”). 
 202 Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Scis. Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1980) (quoting J. T. Healy & Son v. James A. Murphy & Son, 260 N.E.2d 723, 731 (Mass. 1970)); 
see also Wexler, 160 A.2d at 435 (“[S]ociety suffers because competition is diminished by slackening 
the dissemination of ideas, processes and methods.”). 
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The idea behind such assertions is that the workforce will be more pro-
ductive if employers are not able to prevent employees from transferring im-
proved skills from one job to another, and the market is less vulnerable to mo-
nopolies.203 It is also important to note that the economic benefits of keeping 
employees free to move between firms is a subject of controversy, with com-
mentators diverging markedly in their assessment of the implications of legal 
restraints on employees for innovation and economic growth.204 These eco-
nomic debates frequently take center-stage in discussions regarding non-
competition contracts.205 But they have not been central to discussions of the 
General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion. Rather, courts seem far 
more concerned in this context with the welfare of the individual employee 
whose right to work in a particular context is threatened.206 
III. APPLYING THE EXCLUSION 
Deciding what information constitutes general knowledge, skill, and ex-
perience requires courts to have a sophisticated understanding of how to apply 
the Exclusion in a given trade secrets dispute. At present, courts lack this un-
derstanding. Whereas Part II explained the policy goals behind the Exclusion, 
this Part uses that normative framework to develop the Exclusion at a doctrinal 
level. This Part also identifies where courts are currently getting the applica-
tion wrong and recommends ways to improve their analysis. 
                                                                                                                           
 203 SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1268 (Adams, J., concurring) (“Reasonable movement promotes 
competition and the dissemination of ideas, which in turn benefit the consumer. Important values are 
served when the resources of skill and information are allocated in such a manner that they are utilized 
most efficiently to produce goods and services.”) (citation omitted). 
 204 See Michael Risch, Do Non-Compete Agreements Really Impede Innovation?, WRITTEN DE-
SCRIPTION (Apr. 12, 2016, 8:16 AM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2016/04/do-non-compete-
agreements-really-impede.html [https://perma.cc/B8RL-A9U8] (discussing Barnett and Sichelman’s 
critique of the argument that legal restraints on employee mobility harm innovation). Compare Orly 
Lobel, The DTSA and the New Secrecy Ecology, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 369, 376 
(2017) (noting “empirical studies . . . highlighting the effects of diminishing job mobility on economic 
growth, entrepreneurship, and the flow of knowledge”), with Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 35, at 
35–38 (critiquing this argument and the studies that are said to support it). 
 205 This contrasts with how academic discussions proceed with respect to non-compete agree-
ments, where efficiency is often seen as central. Moffatt, Human Capital, supra note 189, at 911 (not-
ing that in discussions surrounding non-competes, the main concern seems to be efficiency rather than 
“personal autonomy and dignitary concerns”). 
 206 While I do not have evidence of this, it could be the fact that in the non-compete context, em-
ployees have signed on to the restraint—so the public interest in mobility seems comparatively more 
significant. 
2019] The General Knowledge Paradox 2445 
A. Core Attributes of the Exclusion—and Where Courts Get Them Wrong 
1. Applies Only When an Individual’s Right to Work Is Threatened 
The first defining attribute of the Exclusion is that it applies only in cases 
in which the trade secret plaintiff seeks a remedy that would hinder another 
person—in particular, a current or former employee—from pursuing his or her 
livelihood.207 The main example is where the plaintiff seeks an injunction pre-
venting the employee from taking a new job or placing conditions on that job. 
Accordingly, the Exclusion potentially applies in cases brought directly against 
departing employees.208 It also potentially applies in cases brought to prevent 
competitors from selling products allegedly developed through the use of trade 
secrets from plaintiff-employers.209 Lastly, the Exclusion potentially applies in 
other similar scenarios, such as where an independent contractor obtains resid-
ual knowledge in the course of a business relationship.210 
In contrast, the Exclusion cannot be raised when there is no individual’s 
livelihood to protect. For instance, the Exclusion would not apply in cases in-
volving third parties who obtain access to secret information through improper 
means211 or in cases involving a former employee who never had time to learn 
the information on the job before the alleged misappropriation occurred.212 
These circumstances do not implicate the Exclusion’s motivating policy con-
                                                                                                                           
 207 See, e.g., Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Particularly in the 
case of a former employee, whose livelihood may well depend on the scope of the former employer’s 
trade secret protection, it is important to permit the employee to use his or her skill, training and expe-
rience.”). 
 208 See, e.g., Wexler v. Greenberg, 160 A.2d 430, 431–32 (Pa. 1960) (employer sued former em-
ployee, a chief chemist, who was allegedly using secret chemical formulas he had developed in his 
work for plaintiff on behalf of a new employer). 
 209 See, e.g., Van Prods. Co. v. Gen. Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 771 (Pa. 1965) 
(plaintiff sought an injunction against competitor defendants to bar them from “making, advertising 
and selling” a product allegedly developed because of the former employee’s knowledge of plaintiff’s 
trade secrets). 
 210 See, e.g., Hicklin Eng’g, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that in the 
context of software programming, an independent contractor working for a particular client “may re-
use the source code for another client’s project” barring a promise not to or an industry norm to the 
contrary), abrogation recognized by RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., 827 F.3d 689 (7th 
Cir. 2016). 
 211 See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(recognizing a cognizable claim for “discovery of a trade secret by any ‘improper’ means”). The Ex-
clusion also presumably would not apply when trade secrets are raised as an evidentiary privilege 
against the government or a litigant trying to gain access to information. There would be no legal 
basis for the person seeking access to argue that this constitutes an employee’s general knowledge, 
skill, and experience. On the trade secret privilege, see Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade 
Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1377–95 (2018) 
(providing a history of the trade secret privilege in both the civil and criminal contexts).  
 212 Cf. Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 466 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (find-
ing the defendant’s lack of experience in the industry and his use of a “ruse” relevant to the secrecy 
analysis). 
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cern to protect individuals’ right to acquire new knowledge and skills from 
their employer. 
a. An Equitable Doctrine—Not a Full Subject Matter Bar 
A consequence of this principle is that, even though many courts charac-
terize the Exclusion as a subject matter bar, the Exclusion is not a complete 
bar.213 It does not apply against the world. The owner of a trade secret may be 
unable to enforce it against its own employee, for whom it constitutes “general 
skill, knowledge, and experience,” yet be able to enforce it against a third party 
who never previously encountered the information.214 
Importantly, there is nothing inherently wrong with characterizing the Ex-
clusion as a subject matter bar, just because it is “relative” in application. As a 
general matter, trade secret law is different from patent law, where rights nec-
essarily operate against the world.215 It is thus not completely inconsistent, as it 
would be in patent law, to tell a trade secret owner that they do not have a right 
against everyone.216 In fact, trade secret law’s “reasonable efforts” requirement 
is also relative in application. The plaintiff’s efforts may be deemed sufficient 
to protect the information as against one defendant—for instance, a photogra-
pher flying a plane over plaintiff’s uncovered plant—but not with respect to 
another defendant, such as an employee who was not given sufficient “notice” 
that the information was intended to be kept secret.217 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See, e.g., Razor Tech., LLC v. Hendrickson, No. 18-654, 2018 WL 2063844, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 
May 3, 2018) (“[T]he concept of a trade secret does not include an employee’s subjective knowledge 
obtained while in the course of employment.” (quoting Select Med. Corp. v. Hardaway, No. 05-3341, 
2006 WL 859741, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2006))); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., 508 
F. Supp. 2d 601, 624 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“General knowledge, skill, and experience gained by an em-
ployee during employment cannot be claimed as a trade secret.”).  
 214 See, e.g., Bickley v. Frutchey Bean Co., 173 F. Supp. 516, 524 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (“[A]n em-
ployer cannot prevent his employee from using the skill and intelligence acquired through experience 
received in the course of the employment.” (emphasis added) (quoting Official Aviation Guide Co. v. 
Am. Aviation Assocs., 150 F.2d 173, 178 (7th Cir. 1945))). 
 215 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (“The patent mo-
nopoly is a reward to the inventor. But such is not the case with a trade secret. . . . The protection is 
merely against breach of faith and reprehensible means of learning another’s secret.”); see also Bone, 
supra note 154, at 267 n.116 (“[R]elative to patent, trade secret law tolerates more potential competi-
tion, which can somewhat mitigate monopoly effects.”). 
 216 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2018) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of 
the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . .”). 
 217 Indeed, it is theoretically possible for an employer to meet the “reasonable efforts” require-
ment with respect to one employee, but not another employee, since the courts tend to view this re-
quirement partly as circumstantial evidence that the employee obtained the information improperly. 
Greater notice that information was intended to be kept secret means an employee more likely acted 
wrongly in obtaining it. See Rowe, Contributory Negligence, supra note 180, at 10–11 (“[W]here a 
plaintiff makes a strong showing of reasonable efforts to protect trade secret information, a court is 
also more likely to infer that the defendant used improper means to obtain the information.”); see also 
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that the 
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As a matter of history and logic, however, it is more accurate to view the 
Exclusion as an equitable doctrine that limits a trade secret owner’s ability to 
enforce its rights against a particular individual for reasons of public policy—
not as a subject matter bar. As mentioned in Part I, courts historically viewed 
the Exclusion as arising from their equitable authority to deny an injunction.218 
Courts continue to reference “equity” and the need to protect employees’ rights 
to pursue an occupation, even as they state that at least some of the information 
plaintiff seeks to protect is not “in truth” a trade secret.219 In practice, many 
courts may find certain trade secrets exist, but then go on to order that the 
court narrow the injunction to protect one or more employees’ rights to pursue 
their livelihood.220 
An example of this approach comes from T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hen-
nessey Motorsports, Inc., a 1998 decision by the Texas Court of Appeals.221 
The defendants, Roy and Joe Terpstra, along with their new employer, T-N-T 
Motorsports, were sued for common law misappropriation of trade secrets re-
lated to high performance upgrades for sports vehicles like the Dodge Viper.222 
For around six years, the Terpstras had worked for the plaintiff, Hennessey 
Motorsports, Inc. (Hennessey), selling a custom enhancement package called 
the “Venom” to Dodge Viper owners.223 The Terpstras quit their jobs at Hen-
nessey to work full-time for a competing body parts shop, T-N-T Motorsports, 
Inc., where they began selling identical performance upgrades at a better price. 
                                                                                                                           
“greater the precautions” plaintiff took to preserve the secrecy of the information, the greater the 
“probability that [defendant] obtained them through a wrongful act; the owner has taken pains to pre-
vent them from being obtained otherwise”). 
 218 See supra notes 68–122 and accompanying text. 
 219 See, e.g., Levine v. E.A. Johnson & Co., 237 P.2d 309, 327 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (“To 
grant the relief prayed for by appellants would virtually operate to deprive respondents of their right to 
pursue a gainful and lawful occupation in the field. . . . This, equity cannot do. . . . Injunction is not 
available to an employer to restrain a former employee if the alleged secrets are not in truth secrets.”); 
see also SI Handling Sys. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1262 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that the district 
court “erred in finding that the appellants’ ‘know-how’” was the employer’s trade secret based on the 
rule that “the employee, upon terminating his employment relationship with his employer, is entitled 
to take with him ‘the experience, knowledge, memory, and skill, which he gained while there em-
ployed.’” (quoting Van Prods., 213 A.2d at 776)); Eng’g Assocs., Inc. v. Pankow, 150 S.E. 2d 56 
(N.C. 1966) (“[E]quity has no power to compel a man who changes employers to wipe clean the slate 
of his memory.” (quoting Peerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 A.D. 715, 717 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1911))). 
 220 See SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1266 (ordering injunction be narrowed and exclude general-
ized activities like “concepting,” because “[a] court of equity should not issue an order that it cannot 
enforce”).  
 221 965 S.W. 2d 18 (Tex. App. 1998). 
 222 Id. at 20–21. The court applied trade secret law based on the common law of Texas at the time. 
The court cited a rule for secrecy that resembles the Uniform Trade Secrets Act’s (UTSA), stating that 
“[t]he word ‘secret’ implies that the information is not generally known or readily available.” Id. at 
22; see also UTSA § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (defining trade secret). Texas adopted a version 
of the UTSA in 2013. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 134A.001–.007 (2013). 
 223 T-N-T Motorsports, 965 S.W.2d at 20. 
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Defendants called their upgrades “Serpent” instead of “Venom.”224 After a 
state trial court granted Hennessey’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the 
defendants appealed on two distinct grounds. First, they argued that the Terp-
stras were “merely utilizing general knowledge and expertise acquired through 
years of experience within the automotive industry.” Second, they claimed 
“that a lack of secrecy prevents [Hennessey’s] alleged confidential information 
from being trade secrets.”225 
The appeals court held in favor of Hennessey, observing that “the specif-
ics of the Venom upgrades” and certain customer and vendor and pricing in-
formation were not generally known to the public and were clearly “confiden-
tial and intended to be kept a secret.”226 The court did not actually address de-
fendants’ additional argument, that the information constituted unprotectable 
general knowledge and expertise. Instead, in recognition of the Terpstra’s con-
cerns “for their right to earn a livelihood in their area of expertise,” the court 
narrowed the injunction to allow the Terpstras to continue performing at least 
some kinds of sports vehicle upgrades at their competing business.227 
The T-N-T Motorsports court’s approach—holding the former employer 
possesses trade secrets but narrowing the injunction to address the employees’ 
right-to-work concerns—is quite common and appears in many of the cases 
addressed in this article.228 The upshot is that, in practice, the Exclusion oper-
ates more like an equitable doctrine that preserves a former employee’s right to 
work rather than like a subject matter bar that fully denies trade secret protec-
tion. 
b. The Ultimate Burden of Proof Is on the Plaintiff 
The major caveat to viewing the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experi-
ence Exclusion as an equitable doctrine is that the burden of proof must still 
                                                                                                                           
 224 Id. at 20–21. 
 225 Id. at 22. 
 226 Id. at 23. 
 227 Id. at 21, 26. Whereas the initial wording prevented Defendants from using “any information” 
related to Dodge Vipers or offering “any types of services” on Dodge Vipers—which was clearly 
overbroad—the court held the injunction should be limited to preventing Defendants from doing those 
activities in a way that used “Hennessey Trade Secret information.” Id. at 25–26. 
 228 See, e.g., Am. Can Co., 742 F.2d at 333–34 (narrowing the requested injunction to take into 
account that it was overbroad and prevented the defendants from using their general, knowledge, skill, 
and experience); Winston Research Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 143–44 (9th 
Cir. 1965) (narrowing lower court’s injunction to protect former employees’ ability to use their gen-
eral skill, knowledge, and experience); L.M. Rabinowitz & Co. v. Dasher, 82 N.Y.S. 2d 431, 439, 442 
(Sup. Ct. 1948) (enjoining a former employee from using the plaintiff’s specific machine, despite 
employee’s argument that he was using only general skill and experience, but narrowing the injunc-
tion to his right to continue working in the business generally); see also SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 
1266 (ordering an injunction to be narrowed and exclude generalized activities like “concepting,” 
because “[a] court of equity should not issue an order that it cannot enforce.”). 
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remain with plaintiff. As with other trade secret subject matter requirements, 
plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove that claimed information is not 
general knowledge, skill, and experience. A leading trade secrets expert ap-
pears to endorse this view, maintaining that, “where there is no restrictive cov-
enant, the plaintiff-employer . . . may have the burden of carefully identifying 
its trade secret and isolating it from the defendant ex-employee’s prior and job-
enhanced skills.”229 This indicates, correctly, that the Exclusion is part of plain-
tiff’s prima facie case and should be treated like other thresholds for protec-
tion, such as the requirement that information not be generally known or readi-
ly ascertainable. 
This comports with the general rule that plaintiffs in trade secrets cases 
bear the burden to show both ownership of trade secrets and that equitable re-
medial factors support plaintiff’s right to a remedy.230 This includes, most rele-
vantly, the factor that the balance of harms, between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant or between plaintiff and third parties, weighs in plaintiff’s favor.231 
This is also in line with the Exclusion’s policy to protect individual employees’ 
right to work because it alleviates the pressures on defendant-employees to 
settle the case early or avoid risky activities like leaving a firm to work else-
where.232 
2. Applies to Information That Is Otherwise Completely Secret 
A second defining attribute of the Exclusion is that it potentially applies 
even to information that is otherwise completely secret to the plaintiff and not 
known at all to others outside the company. As Turner stated in his 1962 trea-
tise: 
[E]ven though a matter be of great value and be secret, if a court de-
cides that it is part of the personal skill, knowledge or experience of 
the disclosee, it will neither enforce a contract fettering the latter’s 
                                                                                                                           
 229 1 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 69, at § 5.02[3][c]. 
 230 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting that “well-established 
principles of equity” require “a plaintiff seeking a[n] . . . injunction must satisfy a four-factor test”); 
U.S. Gypsum Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (“The party asserting the trade secret . . . ha[s] the burden of 
first establishing that the information qualified as a trade secret.”). 
 231 eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 391 (requiring a “balance of hardships between the plaintiff and the 
defendant” to determine whether an equitable remedy shall be granted); Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. 
Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 119 (3d Cir. 2010) (engaging in the balancing analysis); Delta Med. Sys. v. 
Mid-Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 772 N.E.2d 768, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (noting the balancing requirement 
under Illinois law).  
 232 Cf. Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 27, 70–72 (discussing the burden placed on defendants 
if limitations on trade secret law are assessed in the remedies phase). 
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use of it, nor will it issue an injunction impinging on those personal 
attributes of the employee.233  
This means the Exclusion is not limited to the UTSA’s and DTSA’s require-
ment that information not be “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” to 
others.234 Put differently, the Exclusion is not the same as the bar for infor-
mation that is not sufficiently “secret.”  
 And yet, as shown below, many courts today are apparently operating 
under the incorrect assumption that the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experi-
ence Exclusion is largely the same as the not generally known or readily ascer-
tainable requirement. 
a. Conflating the Exclusion with the Not Generally Known or Readily 
Ascertainable Requirement 
The reasoning is tempting and goes as follows. Trade secret law, everyone 
agrees, does not protect information that constitutes “general knowledge, skill, 
and experience.” But, the reasoning goes, this category of excluded infor-
mation is simply a species of the more general requirement, codified in the 
UTSA and the DTSA, that a trade secret cannot be “generally known” or 
“readily ascertainable” to “other persons” to whom it may impart economic 
value.235 The question, in either case, is simply whether the putative trade se-
cret is known to workers in the industry.236 If so, it is unprotectable; if not, it is 
protectable.  
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina provides 
an example of this erroneous reasoning in its 2002 decision in Static Control 
Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc. The court plainly conflated the 
General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion with the not generally 
known requirement in the course of crafting a jury instruction for a case based 
on the North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act.237 A jury found the de-
fendant liable for hiring away the plaintiff’s former employee, Lauren 
Hulse.238 Hulse, the jury found, brought with him valuable trade secrets relat-
                                                                                                                           
 233 TURNER, supra note 45, at 160. 
 234 DTSA, 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2018); UTSA § 1(4).  
 235 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3); UTSA § 1(4). 
 236 See, e.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 396, 418 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(“In the context of trade secret misappropriation, a trade secret is public when it is generally known 
within the relevant industry, not by laymen incapable of understanding or using a particular trade 
secret.”). 
 237 Static Control Components, Inc. v. Darkprint Imaging, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 465, 482 
(M.D.N.C. 2002) (“The contested instruction adequately explained the legal definition of a trade se-
cret. Although the instruction did not specifically exclude generalized skill and knowledge, it did state 
that in order to be a trade secret, the information must ‘derive independent economic value from not 
being generally known or readily ascertainable . . . .’”).  
 238 Id. at 470–71. 
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ing to the chemical and physical properties of toners used in ink cartridges, 
which the plaintiff had developed through extensive testing.239 Defendant 
moved for a new trial based in part on the argument that the jury instruction 
should have distinguished between the plaintiff’s protectable trade secrets and 
Hulse’s unprotectable “generalized skills and knowledge.”240 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument, stating that although defend-
ant “correctly assert[ed] that generalized knowledge and skills cannot be pro-
tected as trade secrets under North Carolina law, the jury instruction adequate-
ly stated the law.”241 It reasoned that the jury instruction included a full state-
ment “that in order to be a trade secret, the information must ‘derive independ-
ent actual or potential commercial value from not being generally known or 
readily ascertainable through independent development or reverse engineering 
by persons who can obtain economic value from disclosure or use.’”242 With-
out further analysis, the court found that instruction sufficiently excluded gen-
eral knowledge, skill, and experience.243 Clearly, the court’s view was that the 
Exclusion was implicit in the law’s requirement that information not be “gen-
erally known or readily ascertainable” to those to whom it may impart value. 
In 1999, the U.S. District Court for the District Of Utah also struggled 
with the same confusion in Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations 
Associates, Inc.244 The plaintiff, Utah Medical Products Inc. (Utah Medical), a 
maker of intrauterine catheter devices, sued several former employees under 
the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act.245 The former employees included a re-
search and design engineer, a vice president of research and development, and 
the company’s former chief executive officer (an inventor named Dr. William 
Wallace). Utah Medical alleged these former employees took documents con-
taining its trade secrets before leaving to start a new company, co-defendant 
Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc., a maker of a competing intrauterine 
catheter device.246 According to Utah Medical, Wallace left the company with 
three boxes containing 17,000 documents, including technical information on 
the catheter’s design and performance in product testing and Utah Medical’s 
business plan.247 
                                                                                                                           
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 481–82. 
 241 Id. at 482. 
 242 Id. (quoting the jury instruction). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1312 (D. 
Utah 1999) (holding that the standard for determining a trade secret is “whether the information is 
generally known and readily ascertainable” to the defendants based on their “knowledge and experi-
ence”), aff’d, 251 F.3d 171 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished disposition). 
 245 Id. at 1292–93. 
 246 Id. at 1293. 
 247 Id. at 1311. 
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The court held for the defendants on the ground that Utah Medical failed 
to identify the trade secrets with the “particularity necessary to separate it from 
the general skill and knowledge possessed by Wallace [and the others].”248 Re-
lying on Utah’s version of the UTSA, Utah Medical argued that the Exclusion 
merely required showing that the information was “not generally known” or 
“readily ascertainable” to others outside the company. The court rejected this 
approach, insisting that Utah Medical also had to demonstrate that the infor-
mation did not fall into the former employees’ general knowledge, skill, and 
experience.249 The standard, the court wrote, “cannot be viewed as whether the 
information is generally known and readily ascertainable to the general public, 
but, based on the defendants’ knowledge and experience, whether the infor-
mation was known or ascertainable to them.”250 Utah Medical could not satisfy 
this standard. Even though at least some of the information Utah Medical 
claimed as trade secrets was entirely unknown outside the company,251 the in-
formation was excluded because it was “known or ascertainable” to the de-
fendant-employees who took it with them and for whom it had become part of 
their unprotectable “expertise and experience with intrauterine catheters.”252 
Although this court may have reached the right outcome, its attempt to in-
sert the Exclusion for general knowledge, skill, and experience into the 
UTSA’s “not generally known” or “readily ascertainable” language is a bit bi-
zarre.253 It is also not accurate because, as shown in Part I, Section C, this lan-
guage was clearly referencing the requirement that information not be known 
within the industry—not the Exclusion.254 The Federal Circuit Court of Ap-
peals appeared to note this oddity, but unfortunately did not take the opportuni-
ty to clarify. In an unpublished opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed for the 
                                                                                                                           
 248 Id. at 1313. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at 1312 (emphases added). 
 251 For example, the court conceded that some of the information in the documents, such as “pre-
liminary market research” and “the idea of placing a membrane in the tip of the [competing intrauter-
ine device]” was funded by Utah Medical and imparted to the defendants in the course of their em-
ployment. Id. at 1313.  
 252 Id. 
 253 Other Utah courts have quoted Utah Medical’s understanding of the “not generally known” 
requirement as indicating not generally known based on the defendant’s knowledge and experience. 
See, e.g., USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 235 P.3d 749, 759–60 (Utah 2010) (“The ‘generally known 
or readily ascertainable’ standard ‘cannot be viewed as whether the information is generally known 
and readily ascertainable to the general public, but, based on the defendant[’s] knowledge and experi-
ence, whether the information was known or ascertainable to [the defendant].’” (quoting Utah Medi-
cal, 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1312)); Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1326 (D. 
Utah 2012) (same). 
 254 See supra notes 123–150 and accompanying text. 
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defendants based only on lack of secrecy.255 The Federal Circuit did not even 
mention the lower court’s discussion of the exclusion for general knowledge, 
skill, and experience. It also did not discuss the lower court’s concession that at 
least some of the information was likely unknown outside Utah Medical. The 
Federal Circuit—simply ignored these portions of the lower court’s opinion.256 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ 1984 decision in American Can 
Co. v. Mansukhani provides a subtler example of conflation, and shows that 
the problem goes beyond confusion regarding the UTSA’s “not generally 
known” language. The plaintiff, American Can Company (American), devel-
oped, made, and sold commercial jet inks, which could be sprayed onto a 
printing surface without direct contact.257 The defendants, a husband, Ishwar 
Mansukhani, and wife, Ruth Brand, were both chemists.258 Mansukhani, 
though not Brand, was a former employee of American and its corporate pre-
decessors.259 Mansukhani was experienced in ink chemistry when hired but 
had no experience with jet inks. While working in American’s laboratory, he 
developed sophisticated knowledge of the company’s ink formulas under a 
strict confidentiality agreement.260 After around four years, Mansukhani left to 
start his own company with Brand, and together they began to market and sell 
their inks to several of American’s customers at “substantially lower” prices.261 
American sued for misappropriation of trade secrets. The district court—
applying Wisconsin law, which was based at the time on the First Restate-
ment262—found Mansukhani took “patent applications, ink formulas and other 
documents” when he left the company, and had been selling “precisely identi-
cal” jet inks to American’s customers.263 The district court issued a permanent 
injunction that enjoined the defendants from using the commercial jet ink for-
mulas that Mansukhani had developed for specific customers while employed 
by American or its corporate predecessors.264 Over a year later, Mansukhani 
allegedly violated the injunction by continuing to sell competing jet inks, and 
American sought a new, even broader injunction to stop them from selling “jet 
                                                                                                                           
 255 Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., 251 F.3d 171 (Table), 2000 WL 
1838586, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13, 2000) (“[T]he district court held that it was undisputed that the 
allegedly copied information was generally known or readily ascertainable to those in the industry.”). 
 256 Id. 
 257 Am. Can Co., 742 F.2d at 317. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 317 & n.1. Wisconsin adopted the UTSA in 1985. WIS. STAT. § 134.90 (2019). 
 263 Id. at 317. 
 264 Id. 
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inks of any type to any of plaintiff’s customers.”265 Overriding the defendants’ 
objections, the district court complied.266 
Defendants immediately appealed the new injunction to the Seventh Cir-
cuit, which the court agreed to hear given its “serious and perhaps irreparable 
consequences for defendants’ business.”267 The Seventh Circuit invalidated the 
new injunction as overbroad and vague in its definition of what constituted a 
trade secret, but it kept the original injunction in place.268 The Seventh Circuit 
was ostensibly concerned that the new injunction, in reaching additional types 
of jet inks not mentioned in the district court opinion, threatened Mansukhani’s 
ability to use his “skill, training and experience.”269 
In its analysis, however, the Seventh Circuit repeatedly conflated this is-
sue with whether the information had been disclosed to the public. The court 
conflated the secrecy requirement and the General Knowledge, Skill, and Ex-
perience Exclusion in its opinion five times.270 This is too many to suggest this 
was just an inadvertent choice of phrasing. Rather, it seems the Seventh Circuit 
did not know the difference between the two legal doctrines or how to articu-
late the difference. This uncertainty leaves litigants to ponder the basis for the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding. Was the problem that the inks were common 
knowledge in the industry? Or was the problem that the inks, while secret and 
developed internally for the plaintiff, constituted part of Mansukhani’s own 
“general knowledge, skill, and experience?” The court never answered this 
question. It failed to provide future parties with a clear conception of the scope 
of trade secret protection under the law. 
 The confusion engendered by such decisions continues to be replicated in 
trade secret law cases. For example, in the Waymo/Uber/Levandowski dispute, 
Judge Alsup invoked a similarly conflated understanding of the Exclusion, as 
encompassed by the requirement of “secrecy.” In his order temporarily remov-
ing Levandoski from his position at Uber, Judge Alsup briefly voiced his un-
certainty over whether Waymo would actually be able to prove Levandowski 
                                                                                                                           
 265 Id. at 318 (emphasis added). 
 266 Id.at 318–19. 
 267 Id. at 319. 
 268 Id. at 333–34. The court also found that the lower court improperly issued an ex parte restrain-
ing order without following “the strict procedural requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b).” Id. at 321. 
 269 See id. at 329. 
 270 Id. at 316 (“At the heart of the case is the problem that courts face in framing orders to prevent 
defendants from competing unfairly by using another’s trade secrets while still permitting defendants 
to compete fairly using public information and their own talents and experience.”) (emphasis added); 
id. at 326 (“However the public information about plaintiff’s ink formulas (particularly as revealed in 
patent documents) and Mansukhani’s own knowledge and experience had placed very narrow limits 
on plaintiff’s trade secrets in the original trial.”) (emphasis added); id. (“The district court therefore 
erred by issuing the new preliminary injunction without finding that defendants’ new inks were . . . 
not from the public information and Mansukhani’s own skill, knowledge and experience.”) (emphasis 
added); see also id. at 329–31, 333. 
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was using any protectable Waymo trade secrets relating to LiDAR. Judge 
Alsup wrote that “[g]eneral approaches dictated by well-known principles of 
physics . . . are not ‘secret,’ since they consist essentially of general engineer-
ing principles that are simply part of the intellectual equipment of technical 
employees. They are therefore not protectible as trade secrets.”271 
In crafting this statement, Judge Alsup relied on the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals’ 1965 decision in Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & 
Manufacturing Co., a leading Exclusion case. In Winston, the Ninth Circuit 
determined that the “general approach” the plaintiff, Minnesota Mining & 
Manufacturing Co. (Mincom), had utilized in designing a system for use in 
tape recorders was “not protectible under accepted trade secret doctrine,” be-
cause it was “dictated by well known principles of physics.”272 Accordingly, 
the system “was not ‘secret,’ for it consisted essentially of general engineering 
principles in the public domain and part of the intellectual equipment of tech-
nical employees.”273 The Winston court’s reference to “the intellectual equip-
ment of technical employees” was apparently a reference to the General 
Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion.274 But like the Seventh Circuit in 
American Can Co., the Winston court was not being clear. Was the problem 
that the plaintiff was trying to protect information that was already in the pub-
lic domain? Or was the problem that the plaintiff was trying to prevent its own 
former employees from using information that had become part of their unpro-
tectable “intellectual equipment,” and without which they would have trouble 
pursing future employment? Judge Alsup and the litigants in Waymo v. Uber—
not to mention the jury that would ultimately have decided the case—inherited 
the same uncertainties. 
b. Why Conflation Is Wrong 
These opinions are representative of many modern courts’ understandings 
of the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion as a species of the 
requirement that a trade secret must not be “generally known” or “readily as-
certainable” to people in the industry.275 To the extent courts view the Exclu-
                                                                                                                           
 271 Waymo LLC v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2017 WL 2123560, at *10 (N.D. 
Cal. May 15, 2017) (citing Winston, 350 F.2d at 139). 
 272 Winston, 350 F.2d at 139. 
 273 Id. (emphasis added). 
 274 Id. at 144. It seems that the court was alluding here to the true Exclusion. Defendant, Winston, 
had expressly argued an injunction that prevented former Mincom employees Johnson and Tobias 
from using Mincom’s approach to designing a recorder in future would render them “substantially 
unemployable in the work for which their specialized training and experience [at Mincom had] 
equipped them.” Id. at 143. 
 275 See, e.g., Hogan Sys., Inc. v. Cybresource Int’l, Inc., No. 3:96-CV-2083-H, 1997 WL 311526, 
at *6 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 1997) (affirming that information relating to the plaintiff’s software was 
unprotectable general knowledge, skill, and experience, because “large numbers of people, including 
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sion as encompassed by the secrecy requirement, this interpretation is wrong. 
The true Exclusion, as explained in Turner’s treatise and the Third Restate-
ment, is a separate, additional, restriction on trade secret protection that con-
strains enforcement of trade secrets for reasons of public policy.276 Whereas 
the not generally known requirement, on its own, actually permits an employer 
to protect information so long as it is not known outside the company, the Ex-
clusion prevents this. It mandates that even if the information was developed 
by the plaintiff-employer, and is completely unknown to others outside the 
company, it can still fall into the unprotectable skill and knowledge of the em-
ployee against whom trade secret law is being used.  
The upshot is that information that passes the secrecy requirement can 
still fall into the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion. This 
caveat is exceptionally important since, as a practical matter, the evidentiary 
inquiries required for applying the two doctrines differ. The secrecy analysis 
asks whether information was generally known or readily ascertainable to av-
erage people in the field. In making the secrecy determination, courts must 
review various information, including patents and other public documents, as 
well as testimony from experts in the field regarding whether people in the 
industry already know the information.277 The plaintiff’s expert will of course 
typically say “no,” while defendant’s expert will say “yes.”278 
The Exclusion, in part, asks the same thing. Testimony from average 
workers in the field is clearly relevant to the question of whether the infor-
mation has become part of the defendant employees’ excluded knowledge, 
skill, and experience. If experts in the field already know certain information, 
then presumably such information is part of the defendant employees’ skill set. 
But determining whether information falls into the Exclusion also requires ask-
ing whether, even if the information is unknown outside the company, it is 
nonetheless part of the general skill, knowledge, and experience of the em-
ployee seeking to use it. Obtaining verification from others in the industry is 
more credible than just the defendants’ testimony on the stand. But this evi-
dence is not enough. If those people in the industry say they do not know cer-
tain information, defendants should still have the chance to show that the in-
                                                                                                                           
people who have never worked for [plaintiff], have acquired comparable facility with [its] systems”), 
aff’d, 158 F.3d 319 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 276 TURNER, supra note 45, at 160; id. at 115; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COM-
PETITION § 42 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (discussing the Exclusion apart from the secrecy re-
quirement). 
 277 See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1199–1203 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(reviewing evidence adduced at trial); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS, § 757 cmt. b (de-
scribing six factors used to determine whether something is a trade secret). 
 278 See Metallurgical, 790 F.2d at 1199 (finding trade secrets existed in part because one of plain-
tiff’s main witnesses, “a consultant very influential” in the relevant industry, “testified as to his belief 
that [plaintiff’s] changes were unknown in the . . . industry”). 
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formation has in actuality become part of their general knowledge and experi-
ence during their time at the company or even during the period prior to work-
ing for the plaintiff. 
Unfortunately, courts typically do not understand this principle. Like in 
Static Control Components Corp. and American Can Co., even when courts 
say they are applying the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclu-
sion, they end up conflating it with the not generally known or readily ascer-
tainable requirement. They do little more than assess whether the putative trade 
secret is sufficiently secret to the company—and just stop there. 
3. Applies to Information Generated and Otherwise Owned by Plaintiff 
The third and most controversial attribute of the Exclusion is that it poten-
tially applies even to information that is generated by the employer and im-
parted to the employee in complete confidence. In other words, it does not just 
apply to trade secrets that the defendant employees themselves invented.  
Under the common law ownership rules, there are generally three types of 
information an employee may come across on the job.  
The first is information that the employer generated, owns, and has im-
parted to an employee in a confidential exchange. For example, imagine Way-
mo provides its employee, Levandowski, with technical blue-prints relating to 
self-driving cars or shows him how to perform internal safety checks during a 
training session.  
The second is information the employee generated in the course of his or 
her duties for the employer. Under common law ownership rules, employees 
do not own information they generate on the job if they have signed an as-
signment agreement—which is quite typical279—or if they are deemed “hired 
to invent,” meaning their primary job responsibility is to create inventions and 
derive technical solutions for the employer.280  
The third type of information is generated by the employee, but totally 
outside the scope of his or her duties. For example, imagine Levandowski 
comes up with a board game in his spare time. This type of employee output is 
not owned by the employer at all.281 
                                                                                                                           
 279 Lobel, New Cognitive Property, supra note 76, at 814 (“[B]usinesses routinely require pre-
innovation assignment contracts in which employees cede all rights to future inventions.”). For a sam-
ple of Google’s assignment agreement, see https://opensource.google.com/docs/iarc/ [https://perma.
cc/G5PC-RZ6T]. 
 280 See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 5 (1999); see also United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188–89 (1933) 
(explaining that under the “shop right,” the employer is entitled to the inventions of the employee 
made “during his hours of employment,” but not inventions unrelated to the employment). 
 281 Employers may have a “shop right” (non-exclusive license) if the employee used employer 
resources to develop the invention. Merges, supra note 280, at 6. 
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One might think that the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Ex-
clusion is limited to secrets of the second and third types—namely, infor-
mation the employee has herself invented or developed. But this is not the 
case. The Exclusion has a merger rule that allows exclusion even of the first 
type of secrets—information that the employee learned on the job through 
training or from others in the company. 
a. The Merger Rule 
The Exclusion’s merger rule holds that even employer-generated infor-
mation or information that would otherwise be owned by the employer ceases 
to be protectable if it becomes “closely integrated”282 or “merged”283 with the 
“skill, knowledge, information or education” that the employee had prior to 
entering the job.284 As Judge Adams stated in his oft-cited concurrence in SI 
Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley: 
[A]n employee’s general knowledge, skill, and experience are not 
trade secrets. . . . When these attributes of the employee are inextri-
cably related to the information or process that constitutes an em-
ployer’s competitive advantage . . . the legal questions confronting 
the court necessarily become bound up with competing public poli-
cies.285 
These public policies include the desire to protect individual employees 
from being hindered in their career pursuits and an economic policy of pre-
serving employee mobility.286 In SI Handling Systems, this principle motivated 
the court to find that some of the information the plaintiff sought to protect as 
trade secrets—such as the general “know-how in systems engineering” that 
                                                                                                                           
 282 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. d. 
 283 Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697 (Utah 1981) (“Confidential in-
formation of an employer . . . loses any protection to which it may have been entitled after it has been 
merged into the employee’s own faculties, skill and experience.”). 
 284 See, e.g., Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 127 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ind. 1955) (“Knowledge, 
skill and information (except trade secrets and confidential information) become a part of the employ-
ee’s personal equipment. They belong to him as an individual for the transaction of any business in 
which he may engage, just the same as any part of the skill, knowledge, information or education that 
was received by him before entering the employment.”) (emphasis added); Dynamics Research Corp. 
v. Analytic Scis. Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1283 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (“The employer’s interest in 
the secret must be crystal clear to justify the restraint of the employee, for whom it may have become 
part of his general knowledge and experience.” (emphasis added) (quoting 2 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, & MONOPOLIES § 53.2(a) (1965))); see also Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. 
Saxelby [1916], 1 AC 688 at 714 (Eng.) (“[A] man’s aptitudes, his skill, his dexterity, his manual or 
mental ability . . . ought not to be relinquished by a servant . . . they are his own property; they are 
himself.”). 
 285 SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1267 (Adams, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 286 Id. 
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would be required to make a materials handling system—was actually unpro-
tectable.287 It had become a part of the “experience, knowledge, memory, and 
skill” which the plaintiff’s former employees had acquired on the job. There-
fore, the employees were permitted to take this information with them.288 
Under the merger rule, courts have authority to follow competing public 
policies in order to exclude even information that was generated by the em-
ployer itself and imparted confidentially to the employee in the course of the 
employee’s job. For example, in 1965 in Van Products Co. v. General Welding 
& Fabricating Co., which is probably the most-cited case on the Exclusion of 
all time, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, Van Products 
Company (Van), could not protect the design of its newly invented air drier.289 
Many years ago, a Van inventor named O. Clair Norton conceived of a 
novel idea for an air drier that could be used to prevent rusting and wearing 
down in metal tools and machinery by using a substance that absorbs moisture 
to dry them.290 Norton filed for a patent on the drier, which was assigned to 
Van.291 In the same year that the patent was issued, Van hired Vincent Rapp to 
work in the mailroom.292 Although not previously experienced in the field, 
Rapp worked hard and eventually became the general manager of the entire 
company.293 During this period Rapp worked closely with Van’s air drier busi-
ness and learned significant amounts of secret information, both on the busi-
ness side and the technical side, including “blue prints drafting, training and 
conducting field experiments to overcome customer difficulties.”294 
Rapp eventually left to work for a competitor, General Welding and Fab-
ricating Company (General). At General, using a lawfully purchased Van prod-
uct, Rapp applied the expertise he learned from Van to “reverse engineer” the 
chemical formula used in the Van drier.295 He then helped General sell a com-
peting air drier, that was “practically identical in function and concept.”296  
Van sued for misappropriation of trade secrets and was successful in ob-
taining an injunction.297 But Van famously lost its case on appeal because the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that much of the information claimed by 
Van as a trade secret—in particular, Rapp’s knowledge of a general market 
                                                                                                                           
 287 Id. at 1261–62 (holding that the “employee experience” and “know-how” that “led to these 
developments” behind the plaintiff’s system “presumably will lead to still further developments” and 
were not protectable). 
 288 Id. at 1262 (quoting Van Prods., 213 A.2d at 776). 
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demand for an air drier, the sources of materials used to make the drier, costs 
of materials and labor, and the identities of suppliers, and methods of advertis-
ing298—had become part of Rapp’s general knowledge, skill and experience 
and thus were not “proper subjects for a mental purge.”299 His “right to use and 
expand” the skills and knowledge he acquired through his employment “re-
main[ed] his property unless curtailed through some restrictive covenant en-
tered into with the employer.”300 
Clearly, Rapp’s employer, and in particular the inventor Norton, was the 
origin of the information that ultimately allowed Rapp to market a competing 
drier. Rapp had merely been exposed to his employer’s secret—he was not the 
progenitor.301 Nonetheless, the court held that Rapp was entitled to take what 
were formerly Van’s trade secrets with him. 302 
b. Ignoring the Merger Rule 
Unfortunately, not all courts invoke the merger rule. Instead, courts in 
multiple states appear to view the Exclusion as limited to situations where the 
employee came on the job with the information already in hand303 or devel-
oped the information herself in the course of the job.304 Although this approach 
may reach a positive outcome for employees in some cases, it drastically nar-
rows the Exclusion’s scope because it does not exclude information that the 
employer, or other employees at the company, generated and disclosed to the 
employee in confidence. 
                                                                                                                           
 298 Id. at 773–74. 
 299 Id. at 776. 
 300 Id.  
 301 Id.  
 302 Id. at 780. 
 303 See, e.g., Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 210 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (“To 
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phasis added) (quoting Cudahy Co. v. Am. Labs., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (D. Neb. 1970))); Struc-
tural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Eng’g Mechs. Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. 
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experience.”) (emphasis added). 
2019] The General Knowledge Paradox 2461 
An example of this narrow interpretation of the Exclusion is demonstrated 
in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 1960 opinion in Wexler v. Greenberg, 
mentioned in Part II, Section C, which is oft-cited for the rule that general 
knowledge, skill, and experience cannot be a trade secret.305 The opinion has 
plentiful dicta on the importance of “the economic mobility of employees,” 
and the court insists that an employee must not be “paradoxically . . . re-
strained, because of his increased expertise, from advancing further in the in-
dustry in which he is most productive.”306 
In reality, Wexler represents a very narrow conception of the Exclusion. 
The plaintiff, Buckingham Wax Company (Buckingham), sought to enjoin its 
former chief chemist, Alvin Greenberg, from using chemical formulas he had 
developed at Buckingham on behalf of a new employer.307 The court stated 
that the information was Greenberg’s “technical knowledge and skill,” which 
he “acquired by virtue of his employment with Buckingham and which he has 
an unqualified privilege to use.”308 But in its analysis, the Court did not actual-
ly assess whether the information was “excluded general knowledge and skill.” 
Rather, it found that Greenberg himself, and not Buckingham or anyone else 
working at Buckingham, had developed (and possibly even owned) the formu-
las.309 The court observed that the typical situation is where trade secret infor-
mation is “disclosed to [the] employee” by the employer during his service or 
because of his position.310 In contrast, in this case, the alleged trade secret for-
mulas were “developed by Greenberg himself, while in the pursuit of his duties 
as Buckingham’s chief chemist.”311 Further, Greenberg’s work was “without 
any appreciable assistance by way of information or great expense or supervi-
sion by Buckingham, outside of the normal expenses of his job.”312 
The Wexler Court’s version of the Exclusion is, at best, that an employer 
cannot restrict a former “highly skilled” employee from using “knowledge of 
formulas and methods” that the employee created on behalf of the employer.313  
This conception of the Exclusion has serious problems. First, it seems to 
contradict the rule that employees who are “hired to invent” do not own what 
they develop in the scope of their duties.314 A leading intellectual property law 
                                                                                                                           
 305 See, e.g., Eleanore R. Godfrey, Note, Inevitable Disclosure of Trade Secrets: Employee Mobil-
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 306 Wexler, 160 A.2d at 435. 
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 314 See Merges, supra note 280, at 5. 
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casebook notes this, observing that Wexler is a very unusual example of a situ-
ation where an employee was deemed to own the output of his work for an 
employer.315 The casebook also notes that the court’s conclusion was highly 
debatable based on the facts, because not only was Greenberg hired by Buck-
ingham as its chief chemist, but the court expressly found Greenburg devel-
oped the formulas in the course of his duties.316 Buckingham, not Greenberg, 
should have owned this work output. 
Second, the fact that Greenberg himself developed the information—and 
may even have owned it, at least in the Wexler court’s conception—should not 
have been required to trigger the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience 
Exclusion.317 This version of the Exclusion is far too narrow. It effectively 
means that so long as an employee learned information from the employer or 
another person working at the company, and did not develop it himself like 
Greenberg did, the Exclusion would not apply. This inquiry would, therefore, 
not help most defendant-employees, who will usually have acquired the al-
leged trade secrets on the job, sometimes directly through disclosures from 
their employer or other employees. 
This is why the Exclusion needs a merger rule. The merger rule allows for 
information to become unprotectable once it becomes connected to an employ-
ee’s own set of knowledge, skill, and experience—even if the employee 
learned it directly from their employer, and even if the information otherwise 
meets the qualifications for a trade secret. 318 Unfortunately, many courts do 
the opposite. Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to ask whether the em-
ployee could have proceeded independently of the knowledge learned from the 
plaintiff-employer; if not, then the information must be the employer’s trade 
                                                                                                                           
 315 MENELL, LEMLEY, & MERGES, supra note 35, at 110. 
 316 Wexler, 160 A.2d at 431, 433; see also MENELL, LEMLEY, & MERGES, supra note 35, at 110 
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secret, rather than the employee’s skill.319 Alternatively, they assess the em-
ployee’s incoming skill, education, and experience.320 How long had the em-
ployee spent in the field prior to working for the plaintiff? What was the em-
ployee’s education level when he or she came onto the job? The effect is simi-
lar. It makes the Exclusion unavailable to people who come onto the job with-
out much prior knowledge, skill, and experience. 
 An oft-cited case illustrates the problem with this approach. In 1982, in 
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chemical Co., the Third Circuit held that the de-
fendant misappropriated the plaintiff’s secret process.321 The court resounding-
ly rejected defendant-employer’s argument that the process had become part of 
the “knowledge, skill, and experience in the field” of plaintiff’s former em-
ployee, Joseph Harvey.322 The court reached this conclusion after making sev-
eral observations about Harvey’s background. For instance, the court noted 
that Harvey did not graduate college and underwent long periods of jobless-
ness.323 Harvey was hired merely as a “laboratory technician,” and was super-
vised by plaintiff’s scientists.324 The facts of “Harvey’s background and the 
testimony of defendants’ agent as to Harvey’s [limited] grasp of the ‘Harvey 
process’ . . . le[ft] little doubt that memory, not ability, was the source of Har-
vey’s revelation.”325 
The assumption of such cases is that if an employee was highly educated, 
skilled, and experienced in the industry when onboarded, it is more likely the 
information the employer seeks to protect was already a part of the employee’s 
general knowledge, skill, and experience.326 Meanwhile, if an employee, like 
Harvey, was not previously educated and skilled, he must have been using his 
                                                                                                                           
 319 See GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762, 769 (S.D. Ohio 1969) (inquiring whether the de-
fendant-employee could have proceeded as she did “independently” of knowledge gained from plaintiff-
employer); see also, e.g., Thiberg v. Bach, 107 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D.N.J. 1952) (“[D]efendant’s 
knowledge relating to aerator pumps was nil prior to his association with plaintiff. Certainly, he may 
use for his own gain the mechanical skill which he has acquired by virtue of his employment. Howev-
er, he may not produce a pump which, but for negligible differences, corresponds identically with that 
of plaintiff, where to do so he must violate plaintiff’s processes imparted to him in confidence.”). 
 320 See, e.g., Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Scis. Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1282 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1980) (noting that former employee “came to his job at [plaintiff] with knowledge and skill 
in the plaintiff’s area of operation” and asserting that his case should thus be distinguished from cases 
involving defendants “who had never seen a machine that in any way resembled the plaintiff’s before 
coming to work for the plaintiff”). 
 321 689 F.2d 424, 432 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id. at 428 n.3. 
 324 Id. at 427. 
 325 Id. at 433. 
 326 Some commentators have noted courts’ tendency to focus on incoming skill, experience, and 
education level, apparently condoning it. See, e.g., Cundiff, Maximum Security, supra note 39, at 321 
(encouraging employers to review a departing employee’s credentials at the time they were hired to 
determine what information is encompassed by the Exclusion). 
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employer’s trade secrets, rather than his own knowledge and skill. But this rea-
soning neglects the possibility that an employee—including a non-college 
graduate like Harvey—learned new secrets while working for the plaintiff, and 
that this newly acquired know-how thereafter became part of his own skill.327 
This form of improvement is supposed to be the whole point.328 The Van Prod-
ucts court certainly recognized this, holding that Van could not stop Rapp from 
using generalized know-how regarding Van’s air driers, despite the fact that 
Rapp had no previous experience in the field and began his career at Van in the 
mailroom.329 Therefore, courts need to be sure to assess whether the infor-
mation an employee newly learned on the job with plaintiff has become some-
thing the employee is now free to use, even if it started as plaintiff’s trade se-
crets. 
B. How to Apply the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion 
In order to revive a more accurate view of the Exclusion that adheres to 
the original policy justifications, courts need a better understanding of how to 
disaggregate trade secrets from employee’s unprotectable general knowledge, 
skill, and experience. This section provides a framework for doing so that stays 
true to the original purpose of the Exclusion, while also providing sufficient 
protection for trade secrets. 
1. The Exclusion as a Scope-Limiting Tool 
 The Exclusion effectively serves as a limitation on the scope of trade se-
crets. This limitation is calibrated based on affected employees’ need to con-
tinue working in the field after departure. Several sources of law posit this line 
of inquiry.330 In particular, the Third Restatement provides that information 
                                                                                                                           
 327 See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 444 F.2d 1313, 1318 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding no trade secret 
misappropriation where the information was part of the defendant’s “native abilities”). 
 328 See supra notes 187–201 and accompanying text. 
 329 Van Prods. Co., 213 A.2d at 771, 776. 
 330 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42, comment (d); see also, e.g., AMP Inc., 
823 F.2d at 1202 (“These skills are valuable to such employee in the market place for his services. 
Restraints cannot be lightly placed upon his right to compete in the area of his greatest worth.” (quot-
ing ILG Indus. V. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 1971))); SI Handling Sys., 753 F.2d at 1267 (Ad-
ams, J., concurring) (“The courts have recognized that someone who has worked in a particular field 
cannot be expected to forego the accumulated skills, knowledge, and experience gained before the 
employee changes jobs. Such qualifications are obviously very valuable to an employee seeking to 
sell his services in the marketplace.”); Bickley, 173 F. Supp. at 524 (“Plaintiff seems to believe that 
because of his former association with plaintiff, [the former employee] was forever precluded from 
getting a job with a [similar] company. That is not our understanding of the law. . . . [The employee] 
was within his legal rights to use his skill, experience and general knowledge, but not trade secrets, to 
assist anybody—competitor . . . or not.”); Futurecraft Corp., 23 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (“To grant plaintiff 
the relief prayed for would in effect restrain [the employee] from the pursuit of his profession. He 
would be deprived of the use of knowledge and skill which he gained which did not originate with 
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that might otherwise be a trade secret can lose its status once it becomes “so 
closely integrated” with an employee’s “overall employment experience that 
protection would deprive the employee of the ability to obtain employment 
commensurate with the employee’s general qualifications.”331  
 This rule directly targets the unique policy goal of the Exclusion—to pre-
serve an employee’s right to acquire new skills, due partly to exposure to trade 
secrets, without losing the ability to leave and pursue new work within the area 
of her expertise.  
 It is true that information that constitutes an employee’s general 
knowledge, skill, and experience may also have other trade secret problems. It 
may not be sufficiently secret, for example, because it is “generally known” to 
people in the industry.332 When the Exclusion is applied to this type of “gener-
ally known” information, it tends to simply duplicate concerns raised by other 
trade secret doctrines like secrecy.333 But when properly construed, the Exclu-
sion places unique limits on trade secrets that are not replicated by these other 
requirements. The Exclusion can thus help ensure that trade secret law does 
not make it unreasonably difficult for employees to work in the area of their 
                                                                                                                           
plaintiff.”); Levine, 237 P.2d at 312 (“To grant the relief prayed for by appellants would virtually 
operate to deprive respondents of their right to pursue a gainful and lawful occupation in the field for 
which they are equipped by virtue of Eskil Johnson’s almost half century of service in his field.”). 
 331 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42, comment (d) (emphasis added). This 
idea also appeared in some prior cases, such as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 1985 decision in SI 
Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley. See 753 F.2d at 1262. 
 332 This is particularly true when the plaintiff is asserting trade secret status for information ob-
tained in the “ordinary experience of business” that is likely to be known elsewhere. See, e.g., AMP 
Inc., 823 F.2d at 1206 (“[A] court will not raise to trade secret status ‘the fruits of ordinary experience 
in . . . business, thus compelling former employees to reinvent the wheel as the price for entering the 
competitive market.’” (quoting Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1985))). 
If the claimed trade secrets consist of a basic marketing strategy or a method of estimating costs, for 
instance, this is probably just generally known to people in the field. See Yellowfin Yachts, Inc. v. 
Barker Boatworks, LLC, 898 F.3d 1279, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018) (former employee’s knowledge of 
plaintiff’s production costs considered general knowledge, skill, and experience, because he had 
learned the costs in the “ordinary course of working” for plaintiff); First Health Grp. Corp. v. Nat’l 
Prescription Adm’rs, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 194, 220 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding the way a health plan 
“administers [a] manufacturers’ rebate program between two departments” was not a trade secret 
because “[f]ormer employees are entitled to use the general skills they learn during their employment 
in future employment”); Tempo Instrument, Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) 
(method of estimating costs); Serv. Ctrs. of Chi., Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1989) (“[T]he knowledge of estimating costs obtained by [the employee] during the course of his 
employment with [the plaintiff] came within the realm of general skills and knowledge which he was 
free to take and use in later pursuits.”). 
 333 See, e.g., Yellowfin Yachts, 898 F.3d at 1298–1301 (rejecting plaintiff’s claim to own trade 
secrets in information regarding costs, customers, and suppliers based on various doctrines, including 
lack of independent economic value). 
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expertise after they leave, even if they were improved by their former employ-
er’s secrets.334 
2. Factors to Assess 
In ascertaining whether trade secret protection would prevent an employ-
ee from continuing to pursue employment commensurate with his or her quali-
fications, courts would logically have to consider two factors. First, how broad 
(or narrow) is the scope of the information the employer seeks to protect? Sec-
ond, how specialized is the employee within the subject matter of the trade 
secrets? 
a. Scope of the Information Claimed 
 With respect to the scope of information claimed, the more generalized 
the information, the broader the scope claimed; the more specific the infor-
mation, the narrower the scope claimed. When a broader scope is claimed, this 
places greater restrictions on what the employee can do upon departure.  
 For example, returning to the Waymo v. Uber case, if Levandowski were 
told that he cannot use the same general approach he learned from Waymo for 
designing self-driving cars and light-ranging and detection (LiDAR) technolo-
gy, this could eliminate future job options in the self-driving car industry.335 
But if he were only enjoined from using “the particular embodiment of these 
general concepts” in Waymo designs, this would not be as much of a limita-
tion.336 While the former restraint would interfere with his ability to work at 
most jobs he might realistically want, the latter would not. 
 Therefore, whether information is excluded as general knowledge, skill, 
and experience should depend partly on whether the plaintiff claims highly 
                                                                                                                           
 334 A recent use of this analysis in a slightly unusual scenario comes from a multidistrict litigation 
decided by Judge Jed Rakoff. See In re Document Techs. Litig., 275 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 
2017). A large e-discovery services provider accused former sales personnel of conspiring to steal 
trade secrets by revealing client sales revenue and the employees’ own sales revenues during negotia-
tions with a potential new employer. Id. at 457–59. Judge Rakoff held that the sales revenue numbers 
were “not protectable, since labeling this kind of knowledge as proprietary would ‘prevent former 
employees from ever pursuing clients or customers whom they believe generate substantial business 
for their former employers.’” Id. at 465–66 (quoting RogersCasey, Inc. v. Nankof, No. 02 Civ. 
2599(JSR), 2003 WL 1964049, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003)). Moreover, since “it is industry prac-
tice for e-discovery providers to ask potential sales hires for their past revenue figures . . . it would be 
extraordinarily difficult (if not impossible) for the [i]ndividual [d]efendants to get a sales job with 
another employer if they were not able to disclose such information.” Id. at 465 n.11. 
 335 This was indeed a major argument Uber made in its defense. See Defendants’ Reply in Sup-
port of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 12, at 4–6 (“The issue is whether Waymo can bar a 
former engineer who applied at Waymo what Waymo’s own witnesses have called the ‘fundamentals 
of optics’ from ever using this general approach again.”). 
 336 See Winston, 350 F.3d at 139. 
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generalized or highly specific information.337 This reflects in part what many 
courts already do. For example, with respect to business information, courts 
readily exclude items like “client relationships, general recollections, or sales 
skills,”338 when broadly defined, but protect the same items so long as deline-
ated with a high level of specificity.339 Likewise in cases involving customer 
lists,340 courts are more likely to protect the list if it is highly specific and sig-
nificantly whittled down from the general customer pool.341 
 Meanwhile, in the high technology context, courts readily exclude general 
principles and approaches adopted by a plaintiff, while protecting specific iter-
ations used in a particular process or device. For example, in Electro-Craft 
Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., the plaintiff sued the defendant alleging that 
defendant—through its president and founder, plaintiff’s former employee, 
John Mahoney—had misappropriated plaintiff’s trade secrets relating to “gen-
eral design principles” used for making various kinds of electric motors and 
that Mahoney had learned on the job.342 The Minnesota Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court’s holding for the plaintiff, but significantly narrowed 
the scope of the lower court’s injunction to include only the “particular combi-
nation of production techniques” that plaintiff used to make certain motors.343 
                                                                                                                           
 337 See TURNER, supra note 45, at 162 (“The most usual distinction . . . is between ‘general’ and 
‘particular’ skill, knowledge, and experience.”). 
 338 Cf. Great Am. Opportunities, Inc. v. Cherry Bros., LLC, No. 3:17-cv-1022, 2018 WL 418567, 
at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 16, 2018) (“Great American, however, does not claim only that the [i]ndividual 
[d]efendants have allowed [their new employer] to use their client relationships, general recollections, 
or sales skills.”). 
 339 Id. 
 340 To be protectable, customer lists, like any trade secret, must not be generally known or readily 
ascertainable to those in the industry. But if the customer list that a plaintiff seeks to protect consists 
merely of the obvious potential customers in the industry or region, the list would not meet this hur-
dle. On the other hand, if a customer list is only “discoverable with great effort” it can potentially be 
protected. See Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 736 (Ct. App. 1997) (“[Plaintiff’s] custom-
ers were not readily ascertainable, but only discoverable with great effort . . . .”). The list’s trade secret 
status could, however, still be vulnerable to a charge that protecting the list would interfere with “the 
right of an employee to leave the employment of his or her employer, open his or her own business 
and compete against the previous employer.” Id. at 734 (internal quotations omitted). 
 341 For example, in 1997 in Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, a California appeals court rejected former em-
ployees’ argument that in using their former employer’s customer list, they had used only their general 
knowledge, skills and experience, in part because the employer provided “a relatively unusual” ser-
vice. 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734, 735; see also Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v. Miller, 151 Cal. Rptr. 
118, 121 (Ct. App. 1978) (“‘There can be no doubt that (a) list of preferred customers, ascertained 
originally by continuous solicitation and investigation, and the specially arranged list of charges and 
bonuses developed by long experience, (constitutes) a trade secret of value.’ Moreover, where, in 
order to do business the employer is forced to impart such select information to certain key employ-
ees, the information hardly becomes part of the employees’ knowledge which they may freely use at 
some later time.” (citation omitted) (quoting Scavengers’ Protective Ass’n v. Serv-U-Garbage Co., 24 
P.2d 489, 492 (Cal. 1933))). 
 342 332 N.W.2d 890, 893, 900 (Minn. 1983). 
 343 Id. at 899–900. 
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The court chastised the lower court for allowing the plaintiff to prevent its 
former employees and the defendant from using industry-wide design princi-
ples for a broader array of motors.344 If such a broad scope of information were 
classified as trade secrets, the court wrote, the plaintiff would be able “to pro-
tect, not a specific combination of features, but the design process of trial and 
error, (including the talent of [plaintiff’s] employees), by which those features 
are adapted to a given use.”345 
In forcing plaintiffs to narrow the scope of the information they claim as 
trade secrets, the Exclusion reinforces trade secret law’s “particularity” re-
quirement, which generally mandates that plaintiffs “identify a trade secret 
with sufficient particularity so as to enable a defendant to delineate that which 
he is accused of misappropriating . . . .”346 Indeed, courts frequently state that 
determining whether claimed information constitutes merely an employee’s 
general knowledge, skill, and experience requires identifying that information 
with “precision and particularity.”347 The Exclusion is not, however, the same 
as the particularity requirement. Whereas the particularity requirement is mere-
ly a threshold procedural rule, basically a pleading standard, the Exclusion is a 
substantive limitation, requiring plaintiffs and courts to narrow the scope of 
what can be claimed precisely in order to protect affected employees’ ability to 
find suitable work after they leave.348   
                                                                                                                           
 344 Id. at 898. 
 345 Id. at 900 (“The law of trade secrets will not protect talent or expertise, only secret infor-
mation.”). 
 346 See Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, 579 S.E.2d 449, 453 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (citing IDX 
Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 584 (7th Cir. 2002)); see, e.g., Del Monte Fresh Produce 
Co. v. Dole Food Co. Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2001); FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote 
Mineral Co., 899 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (W.D.N.C. 1995); Xerox Corp. v. IBM Corp., 64 F.R.D. 367, 
371–72 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also Friesen, supra note 32, at 2123 (“[D]efining the trade secret with 
particularity aids in distinguishing between the secret information and the ex-employee’s general 
knowledge and skill.”). 
 347 Utah Med. Prods., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 (holding that plaintiff “must define its claimed trade 
secret with the precision and particularity necessary to separate it from the general skill and 
knowledge possessed by [the employee defendants]”); Merck & Co. Inc. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443, 
1462 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (“[I]n order to ensure that [the new employer] is not prohibited from [using the 
employee-defendant’s] general knowledge and expertise, and that [defendant] is thereby allowed to 
use that general knowledge and expertise, plaintiffs were required to specifically identify their trade 
secrets.”). 
 348 At least one court has noted this distinction, reprimanding the lower court for assuming that 
the particularity requirement replicated the Exclusion. See Rohm & Haas Co., 689 F.2d at 432 (“[T]he 
district court used [the particularity requirement] as a surrogate for the inquiry into whether the al-
leged secret was knowledge, skill and experience in the field (that) is more likely to accompany the 
employee without protection.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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b. Specialization of Employee Within the Subject Matter of the Trade 
Secrets 
 A court would also have to consider how specialized the employee is in 
the subject matter of the claimed trade secrets. While this may seem like an 
odd consideration, logically, this factor can make all the difference. For exam-
ple, if the defendant in a trade secrets case is a general-purpose cook, being 
ordered not to make a very specific recipe for oatmeal raisin cookies would not 
likely hinder her ability to pursue work in her area of expertise. On the other 
hand, if the defendant is highly specialized in the subject matter of the secret—
for example, she’s a dessert specialist known for her oatmeal raisin cookies—
then being ordered not to use an oatmeal raisin cookie recipe she absorbed at 
her last job would place more of a limit on her future job options than in the 
former scenario.349 Analogizing again to Levandowski’s case, the fact that his 
career has been focused on self-driving cars makes a big difference. He is so 
specialized in self-driving cars, that being ordered not to use a design for a 
self-driving car that represents the state of art could make it impossible for him 
to find work “commensurate with [his] general qualifications.”350 
 The Ninth Circuit observed precisely this problem in Winston,351 which 
Uber cited as precedent for protecting Levandowski’s ability to use his exper-
tise in the self-driving car field.352 The “burdens [that post-employment re-
straints] impose upon the employee and society,” the court wrote, “increase in 
proportion to the significance of the employee’s accomplishments, and the de-
gree of his specialization.”353 
The Winston case itself is highly illustrative—which is presumably one 
reason Uber cited it. Plaintiff, Mincom, spent four years developing a precision 
tape recorder whose design improved functionality and reduced time dis-
placement error.354 Defendant, Winston, developed, in a remarkably short peri-
od of time, a similarly improved tape recorder.355 Winston allegedly accom-
plished this feat by hiring many former Mincom technicians (including em-
                                                                                                                           
 349 See, e.g., AMP Inc., 823 F.2d at 1205–06 (declining to grant injunctive relief because it would 
preclude the employee from working in the field for which he was highly qualified); Winston, 350 
F.2d at 143 (finding injunction overly broad). 
 350 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42, comment (d).   
 351 See Winston, 350 F.2d at 142 (“A permanent injunction would subvert the public’s interest in 
allowing technical employees to make full use of their knowledge and skill and in fostering research 
and development.”); Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 900 n.11 (noting the risk of “stifling the ability of 
employees to leave their employment and compete with their former employers . . . using ‘state of the 
art’ knowledge”). 
 352 Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 12, at 3. 
 353 Winston, 350 F.2d at 137–38 (emphasis added). 
 354 Id. at 137. Mincom’s mechanical improvements consisted, generally speaking, of eliminating 
the flywheel on the recorder and reducing the size of all other moving parts, in order to increase the 
efficacy of the machine’s “servo system.” Id. 
 355 Id.  
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ployees named Johnson and Tobias), who helped develop the Mincom de-
vice.356 Mincom sued Winston for misappropriation of trade secrets, and the 
district court granted an injunction prohibiting “disclosure or use of the speci-
fications of Mincom’s machine for a period of two years from the date of 
judgment.” 357 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Winston argued that an injunction pre-
venting Johnson and Tobias, who were by now highly specialized in tape re-
corder technology, from using Mincom’s approach to designing a recorder 
would render them “substantially unemployable in the work for which their 
specialized training and experience ha[d] equipped them.”358 The Ninth Circuit 
responded by applying the Exclusion to ensure that the injunction would not 
bar the “former Mincom employees from engaging in any development work 
in this area at all.”359 The “general approach” Mincom used developing its ma-
chine was not protectable because it was “part of the intellectual equipment of 
technical employees.”360 In contrast, trade secret law could encompass “the 
particular embodiment” of the Mincom machine’s “general concepts,” because 
this would not prevent Mincom’s former employees from continuing to work 
in their area of expertise.361 
 If the court had not narrowed the injunction, the employees would not 
have the ability to use the highly specialized skills, knowledge, and experience 
built up over the years at Mincom.362 Due to their high degree of specialization 
in Mincom recorder devices, they would have become essentially unemploya-
ble, in the jobs “for which their specialized training and experience [had] 
equipped them.”363 
Not only does this approach of favoring highly specialized employees 
comport with the policy behind the Exclusion, it has significant support in the 
literature and in what some courts already do—although not always for the 
right reasons.364  
                                                                                                                           
 356 Id.  
 357 Id. at 136, 141. The district court also forced Winston to assign patent applications involving 
inventions developed during the employees’ time at Mincom. Id. at 146. 
 358 Id. at 143. 
 359 Id. at 144. 
 360 Id. at 139; see also id. at 144 (noting that “Mincom’s former employees cannot be denied the 
right to use their general skill, knowledge, and experience, even though acquired in part during their 
employment by Mincom”). 
 361 Id.  
 362 Id. at 143–44; see also Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 250 
(S.D. Cal. 1958) (“[T]he courts will not deprive the employee of the right to use the skill he developed 
through the years.”). 
 363 Winston, 350 F.2d at 143.  
 364 See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 594 (N.Y. 1976) (“[W]e 
cannot agree that [the employee] should be prohibited from utilizing his knowledge and talents in this 
area. A contrary holding would make those in charge of operations or specialists in certain aspects of 
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For example, in Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp., the 
Massachusetts Court of Appeals applied the Exclusion in favor of an employee 
who already had extensive experience in the field of the alleged trade se-
crets.365 The plaintiff, Dynamics Research Corporation (DRC), had developed 
a proprietary “technical information retrieval and analysis system” known as 
TIRAS.366 When DRC’s employee, Robert Bicknell, who was in charge of 
marketing the TIRAS system, went to work for another company, DRC sued 
both Bicknell and his new employer Analytic Sciences Corp. (Analytic) for 
misappropriation of trade secrets.367  
The lower court denied DRC’s motions for injunctive relief and damages 
based on the rule that “an employee upon terminating his employment may 
carry away and use the general skill or knowledge acquired during the course 
of the employment.”368 In reaching this holding, the court observed that Bick-
nell was hired by DRC as “an inertial guidance engineer,” and came to DRC 
with an abundance of experience and skill in the industry.369 Indeed, Bicknell 
was hired by DRC precisely because he already had a grasp on the plaintiff’s 
product.370 The court recited Bicknell’s impressive resume, including his time 
at MIT and the Naval Academy, the multiple graduate degrees he received 
from the University of Michigan, and Bicknell’s many years of experience in 
the field.371 The court held Bicknell’s case should thus be treated more favora-
bly than cases involving less skilled and experienced defendants, who “had 
never seen a machine that in any way resembled the plaintiff’s before coming 
to work for the plaintiff.”372 
There are a few possible justifications for the Dynamic Research Corp. 
court’s decision and reasoning. The first is that people, like Bicknell, who 
come to a job with prior education, training, and expertise are more likely to 
have derived the claimed trade secrets themselves or from others in the field, 
rather than from their employers. But as explained above, this view of the Ex-
                                                                                                                           
an enterprise virtual hostages of their employers.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (relying on 
agency law). 
 365 Dynamics Research Corp., 400 N.E.2d at 1285–86; id. at 1285 n.23 (applying the First Re-
statement). 
 366 Id. at 1275. 
 367 Id. at 1275, 1281. 
 368 Id. at 1282 (quoting Junker v. Plummer, 67 N.E.2d 667, 669 (Mass. 1946)). 
 369 Id. 
 370 Id. 
 371 Id. at 1280–81. 
 372 Id. at 1282. To justify this reasoning, the court cited to a Harvard Law Review article about 
non-competition agreements by Harlan Blake. Id. at 1282–83 (citing Blake, supra note 91, at 684–85). 
Blake asserted that courts should be more willing to protect highly specialized employees against 
post-employment restraints, because “the loss to the individual and the economic loss to society are 
both greatest” if that “highly trained and specialized person is prevented from employing his special 
abilities” in a new job or business. Blake, supra note 91, at 684–85. 
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clusion is too narrow. It fails to take into account that information can poten-
tially be excluded even if the employee acquired it directly from the plain-
tiff.373  
A second justification is that highly trained and specialized people are 
simply more valuable in the workforce and more valuable for society. This is a 
highly problematic assumption. How would a court know which types of 
workers are more valuable in the current labor market than others? 
The third explanation is the best. Employees, like Bicknell, who are high-
ly specialized in the subject matter to which the alleged trade secrets pertain 
should be more shielded from post-employment restraints because they are 
suitable for a much narrower range of jobs after they leave. The General 
Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion seeks to ensure trade secret law 
does not deprive an employee of the ability to pursue work in the industry for 
which he or she is best equipped; it therefore makes perfect sense for a court to 
be more protective of highly specialized people whose primary job options lie 
in the same subject matter as the claimed trade secrets. 
To be clear, the court also must consider the first factor: the scope of the 
information claimed. If the employer is claiming highly specific information as 
a trade secret—not the general approach for doing something that has now be-
come state of the art—it probably does not matter how specialized the employ-
ee is. The restraint on future job options would not be too severe. In sum, the 
main effect of the Exclusion should be as a scope-limiting tool, with the limita-
tion on scope calibrated by trade secret law’s impact on affected employees. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates that, despite plentiful dicta, courts do not accu-
rately apply and sometimes do not understand trade secret law’s General 
Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion. Many courts view the Exclusion 
as merely an extension of the secrecy requirement. They thus assess only 
whether information is generally known to people within the industry. These 
courts do not inquire further to determine whether the claimed secret might 
nonetheless be excluded from protection. Other courts assess whether the em-
ployee generated the information rather than her employer or assess only an 
employee’s incoming education and experience to determine whether the in-
formation is excluded. This effectively makes the Exclusion off-limits to em-
ployee-defendants who acquire new knowledge, skill, and experience on the 
job, due partly to exposure to their employer’s trade secrets. 
The true Exclusion is broader in scope. It excludes from protection even 
information that would otherwise be the employer’s trade secret and that 
                                                                                                                           
 373 See supra notes 279–329 and accompanying text. 
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would otherwise be owned by the employer.374 Since neither the UTSA nor the 
DTSA explicitly codified the Exclusion, the burden is on common law and the 
courts to ensure the Exclusion survives. There are a few things courts should 
understand.  
First, as a matter of policy, the Exclusion encapsulates one of trade secret 
law’s most sacred principles: workers who have not signed an enforceable con-
tract stating otherwise are allowed to gain new knowledge, skills, and experi-
ences on the job and transfer those improvements to different opportunities in 
the field. The Exclusion should thus not be limited to where the employee or 
others in the industry already knew what the employee now seeks to use.375 
Second, as a matter of practice, information should be excluded as gen-
eral knowledge, skill, and experience if the plaintiff’s former employee or oth-
er similarly situated party could not reasonably work in the subject matter to 
which the trade secrets pertain without the ability to use it.376 This effectively 
turns the Exclusion into a limitation on the scope of trade secrets. When the 
employer claims a very broad scope, the information is most likely to be ex-
cluded—especially if the employee is also highly specialized in the subject 
matter of the secrets.377 
In light of this Article’s corrections, courts should more accurately identi-
fy, state, and apply the General Knowledge, Skill, and Experience Exclusion. 
Even if they do not use it to deny trade secret protection, they must at least 
take it into account at the remedial stage when considering the employee’s in-
terest in pursuing work, as compared to the employer’s interest in protecting 
trade secrets.378 
                                                                                                                           
 374 See supra notes 279–329 and accompanying text. 
 375 See supra notes 233–329 and accompanying text. 
 376 See supra notes 330–334 and accompanying text. 
 377 See supra notes 337–373 and accompanying text. 
 378 Cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (noting equity’s long-
standing balancing requirement). 
  
 
